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Homo Oeconomicus Versus Homo Reciprocans: Ans�tze f�r ein Neues Wirtschaftspolitisches Leitbild?

  • Armin Falk

Politik und �ffentliches Bewusstsein werden zunehmend durch �konomische Theorien und Handlungsvorschl�ge mitbestimmt. Kaum ein anderes erkenntnis- und handlungsleitendes Modell hat daher einen vergleichbaren Einfluss wie das Konzept des Homo Oeconomicus. Durch die Entwicklung experimenteller Methoden ist es m�glich, die Annahmen dieses Konzepts unter kontrollierten Laborbedingungen mit dem tats�chlichen Handeln von Individuen zu vergleichen. In der vorliegenden Arbeit werden zun�chst verschiedene Experimentalstudien diskutiert, die eindeutig belegen, da� der Homo Oeconomicus weitaus weniger universell ist, als gemeinhin angenommen. Die Mehrheit der Experimentalteilnehmer verh�lt sich reziprok, d.h. sie belohnt faires Verhalten und bestraft unfaires Verhalten, selbst wenn dies mit Kosten verbunden ist. Der Nachweis reziproken Verhaltens hat weitreichende Konsequenzen f�r die �konomische Politikberatung

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Paper provided by Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - University of Zurich in its series IEW - Working Papers with number 079.

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