Die Vergabe der Olympischen Spiele durch das IOC: Eine institutionenökonomische Analyse
In: Zur Ökonomik von Spitzenleistungen im internationalen Sport
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- Susan Rose-Ackerman, 1995. "How China could have won: The nonneutrality of the olympic voting rules," Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 14(1), pages 140-142.
- Wolfgang Maennig, 2002. "On the Economics of Doping and Corruption in International Sports," Journal of Sports Economics, , vol. 3(1), pages 61-89, February.
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