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AI and Social Media: A Political Economy Perspective

In: The Political Economy of Artificial Intelligence

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Listed:
  • Daron Acemoglu
  • Asuman Ozdaglar
  • James Siderius

Abstract

We consider the political consequences of the use of artificial intelligence (AI) by online platforms engaged in social media content dissemination, entertainment, or electronic commerce. We identify two distinct but complementary mechanisms, the social media channel and the digital ads channel, which together and separately contribute to the polarization of voters and consequently the polarization of parties. First, AI-driven recommendations aimed at maximizing user engagement on platforms create echo chambers (or “filter bubbles”) that increase the likelihood that individuals are not confronted with counter-attitudinal content. Consequently, social media engagement makes voters more polarized, and then parties respond by becoming more polarized themselves. Second, we show that party competition can encourage platforms to rely more on targeted digital ads for monetization (as opposed to a subscription-based business model), and such ads in turn make the electorate more polarized, further contributing to the polarization of parties. These effects do not arise when one party is dominant, in which case the profit-maximizing business model of the platform is subscription-based. We discuss the impact regulations can have on the polarizing effects of AI-powered online platforms.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • Daron Acemoglu & Asuman Ozdaglar & James Siderius, 2025. "AI and Social Media: A Political Economy Perspective," NBER Chapters, in: The Political Economy of Artificial Intelligence, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberch:15133
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    5. Daron Acemoglu & Asuman Ozdaglar & James Siderius, 2024. "A Model of Online Misinformation," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 91(6), pages 3117-3150.
    6. Nayak, Sameera S. & Fraser, Timothy & Panagopoulos, Costas & Aldrich, Daniel P. & Kim, Daniel, 2021. "Is divisive politics making Americans sick? Associations of perceived partisan polarization with physical and mental health outcomes among adults in the United States," Social Science & Medicine, Elsevier, vol. 284(C).
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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • L10 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - General
    • P40 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Other Economic Systems - - - General
    • M37 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Marketing and Advertising - - - Advertising

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