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John Yiran Zhu

Personal Details

First Name:John
Middle Name:Yiran
Last Name:Zhu
Suffix:
RePEc Short-ID:pzh923
[This author has chosen not to make the email address public]
https://sites.google.com/site/johnyiranzhu

Affiliation

Department of Economics
University of Kansas

Lawrence, Kansas (United States)
http://economics.ku.edu/
RePEc:edi:deuksus (more details at EDIRC)

Research output

as
Jump to: Working papers Articles

Working papers

  1. John Zhu & Marcus Opp, 2014. "Impatience vs. incentives," 2014 Meeting Papers 125, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  2. Edmans, Alex & Goldstein, Itay & Zhu, John, 2013. "Contracting With Synergies," CEPR Discussion Papers 9747, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.

Articles

  1. John Y. Zhu, 2018. "A Foundation for Efficiency Wage Contracts," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 10(4), pages 248-288, November.
  2. John Y Zhu, 2018. "Myopic Agency," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 85(2), pages 1352-1388.
  3. Marcus M. Opp & John Y. Zhu, 2015. "Impatience versus Incentives," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 83(4), pages 1601-1617, July.
  4. John Y. Zhu, 2013. "Optimal Contracts with Shirking," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 80(2), pages 812-839.

Citations

Many of the citations below have been collected in an experimental project, CitEc, where a more detailed citation analysis can be found. These are citations from works listed in RePEc that could be analyzed mechanically. So far, only a minority of all works could be analyzed. See under "Corrections" how you can help improve the citation analysis.

Working papers

  1. Edmans, Alex & Goldstein, Itay & Zhu, John, 2013. "Contracting With Synergies," CEPR Discussion Papers 9747, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.

    Cited by:

    1. Kelly Huang & Brent Lao & Gregory McPhee, 2020. "Internal information quality and patent‐related innovation," Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 47(3-4), pages 489-518, March.
    2. Nian Yang & Jun Yang & Yu Chen, 2018. "Contracting in a Continuous-Time Model with Three-Sided Moral Hazard and Cost Synergies," Graz Economics Papers 2018-06, University of Graz, Department of Economics.
    3. Guay, Wayne R. & Kepler, John D. & Tsui, David, 2019. "The role of executive cash bonuses in providing individual and team incentives," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 133(2), pages 441-471.
    4. Alex Edmans & Xavier Gabaix, 2015. "Executive Compensation: A Modern Primer," NBER Working Papers 21131, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

Articles

  1. John Y. Zhu, 2018. "A Foundation for Efficiency Wage Contracts," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 10(4), pages 248-288, November.

    Cited by:

  2. John Y Zhu, 2018. "Myopic Agency," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 85(2), pages 1352-1388.

    Cited by:

    1. Alex Edmans & Xavier Gabaix, 2015. "Executive Compensation: A Modern Primer," NBER Working Papers 21131, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

  3. Marcus M. Opp & John Y. Zhu, 2015. "Impatience versus Incentives," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 83(4), pages 1601-1617, July.

    Cited by:

    1. Hoffmann, Florian & Inderst, Roman & Opp, Marcus M., 2018. "Only time will tell: A theory of deferred compensation," SAFE Working Paper Series 218, Leibniz Institute for Financial Research SAFE.
    2. Fong, Yuk-fai & Li, Jin, 2017. "Relational contracts, limited liability, and employment dynamics," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 169(C), pages 270-293.
    3. Felix Feng, 2018. "Dynamic Compensation under Uncertainty Shocks and Limited Commitment," 2018 Meeting Papers 159, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    4. Eduardo Zilberman & Vinicius Carrasco & Pedro Hemsley, 2019. "Risk sharing contracts with private information and one-sided commitment," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 68(1), pages 53-81, July.

  4. John Y. Zhu, 2013. "Optimal Contracts with Shirking," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 80(2), pages 812-839.

    Cited by:

    1. Borys Grochulski & Yuzhe Zhang, 2016. "Optimal Contracts with Reflection," Working Paper 16-14, Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond.
    2. Martin Szydlowski, 2014. "Incentives, Project Choice, and Dynamic Multitasking," 2014 Meeting Papers 1240, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    3. Stephen Terry & Anastasia Zakolyukina & Toni Whited, 2018. "Information Distortion, R&D, and Growth," 2018 Meeting Papers 217, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    4. Rui Li & Dana Kiku & Hengjie Ai, 2014. "A Mechanism Design Model of Firm Dynamics: The Case of Limited Commitment," 2014 Meeting Papers 855, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    5. Jianjun Miao & Alejandro Rivera, 2016. "Robust Contracts in Continuous Time," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 84(4), pages 1405-1440, July.
    6. Li, Rui, 2017. "Dynamic agency with persistent observable shocks," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 71(C), pages 74-91.
    7. Fong, Yuk-fai & Li, Jin, 2017. "Relational contracts, limited liability, and employment dynamics," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 169(C), pages 270-293.
    8. Feng, Felix Zhiyu & Westerfield, Mark M., 2021. "Dynamic resource allocation with hidden volatility," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 140(2), pages 560-581.
    9. Mahmoud Sami Nabi, 2016. "Revisiting equity and debt: access to finance and economic inefficiency," International Review of Economics, Springer;Happiness Economics and Interpersonal Relations (HEIRS), vol. 63(4), pages 393-429, December.
    10. Rui Li, 2018. "Could Risk Management Be Harmful to Firms?," Annals of Economics and Finance, Society for AEF, vol. 19(1), pages 247-263, May.
    11. Peter G. Hansen, 2021. "New Formulations of Ambiguous Volatility with an Application to Optimal Dynamic Contracting," Papers 2101.12306, arXiv.org.
    12. Felix Feng, 2018. "Dynamic Compensation under Uncertainty Shocks and Limited Commitment," 2018 Meeting Papers 159, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    13. Li, Jin & Mukherjee, Arijit & Vasconcelos, Luis, 2019. "Rulebooks in Relational Contracts," Working Papers 2019-7, Michigan State University, Department of Economics.
    14. Ingolf Dittmann & Ko-Chia Yu & Dan Zhang, 2017. "How Important Are Risk-Taking Incentives in Executive Compensation?," Review of Finance, European Finance Association, vol. 21(5), pages 1805-1846.
    15. Tak-Yuen Wong, 2019. "Dynamic Agency and Endogenous Risk-Taking," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 65(9), pages 4032-4048, September.
    16. Rui Li & Kai Li & Hengjie Ai, 2017. "Moral Hazard and Investment-Cash-Flow Sensitivity," 2017 Meeting Papers 410, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    17. Jean-Paul Décamps & Stéphane Villeneuve, 2019. "A two-dimensional control problem arising from dynamic contracting theory," Finance and Stochastics, Springer, vol. 23(1), pages 1-28, January.
    18. Rui Li & Mengying Wang, 2020. "Moral Hazard, Agency Cost, and Firm Growth," International Review of Finance, International Review of Finance Ltd., vol. 20(3), pages 639-664, September.
    19. Piskorski, Tomasz & Westerfield, Mark M., 2016. "Optimal dynamic contracts with moral hazard and costly monitoring," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 166(C), pages 242-281.
    20. Stephen J. Terry & Toni M. Whited & Anastasia A. Zakolyukina, 2020. "Information versus Investment," Working Papers 2020-110, Becker Friedman Institute for Research In Economics.
    21. Hiroshi Osano & Keiichi Hori, 2015. "A Dynamic Agency Theory of Investment and Managerial Replacement," KIER Working Papers 921, Kyoto University, Institute of Economic Research.
    22. Peng Sun & Feng Tian, 2018. "Optimal Contract to Induce Continued Effort," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 64(9), pages 4193-4217, September.
    23. Ai, Hengjie & Li, Rui, 2015. "Investment and CEO compensation under limited commitment," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 116(3), pages 452-472.

More information

Research fields, statistics, top rankings, if available.

Statistics

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Co-authorship network on CollEc

NEP Fields

NEP is an announcement service for new working papers, with a weekly report in each of many fields. This author has had 3 papers announced in NEP. These are the fields, ordered by number of announcements, along with their dates. If the author is listed in the directory of specialists for this field, a link is also provided.
  1. NEP-CTA: Contract Theory & Applications (3) 2011-11-28 2013-09-28 2014-06-02. Author is listed
  2. NEP-MIC: Microeconomics (3) 2011-11-28 2013-09-28 2014-06-02. Author is listed
  3. NEP-BEC: Business Economics (2) 2011-11-28 2013-09-28. Author is listed
  4. NEP-HRM: Human Capital & Human Resource Management (2) 2013-09-28 2014-06-02. Author is listed
  5. NEP-HPE: History & Philosophy of Economics (1) 2013-09-28. Author is listed
  6. NEP-PPM: Project, Program & Portfolio Management (1) 2011-11-28. Author is listed

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