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Randy G. Silvers

Personal Details

First Name:Randy
Middle Name:G.
Last Name:Silvers
Suffix:
RePEc Short-ID:psi176

Affiliation

Department of Economics
Business School
Deakin University

Melbourne, Australia
http://www.deakin.edu.au/business/economics

:
+61 3 5227 2655
221 Burwood Highway, Burwood 3125.
RePEc:edi:sedeaau (more details at EDIRC)

Research output

as
Jump to: Working papers Articles

Working papers

  1. Silvers, Randy, 2008. "Scientific and religious mindsets: a candid look at the perils of a Panglossian President," Economics Series eco_2008_01, Deakin University, Faculty of Business and Law, School of Accounting, Economics and Finance.
  2. Silvers, Randy, 2006. "The value of information in an agency model with moral hazard," Economics Series eco_2006_22, Deakin University, Faculty of Business and Law, School of Accounting, Economics and Finance.
  3. Silvers, Randy, 2006. "The value of symmetric information in an agency model with moral hazard: the ex ante contracting case," Economics Series eco_2006_23, Deakin University, Faculty of Business and Law, School of Accounting, Economics and Finance.
  4. Hector Chade & Randolph Silvers, "undated". "Informed Principal, Moral Hazard, and the Value of a More Informative Technology," Working Papers 2133302, Department of Economics, W. P. Carey School of Business, Arizona State University.

    repec:dkn:econwp:eco_2014_4 is not listed on IDEAS

Articles

  1. Imroze Nandha & Harminder Singh & Randy Silvers, 2012. "Does Momentum Still Exist in the Australian Stock-Market?," International Journal of Business and Economics, College of Business and College of Finance, Feng Chia University, Taichung, Taiwan, vol. 11(1), pages 89-92, June.
  2. Silvers, Randy, 2012. "The value of information in a principal–agent model with moral hazard: The ex post contracting case," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 74(1), pages 352-365.
  3. Phillip Hone & Randy Silvers, 2006. "Measuring the Contribution of Sport to the Economy," Australian Economic Review, The University of Melbourne, Melbourne Institute of Applied Economic and Social Research, vol. 39(4), pages 412-419, December.
  4. Chade, Hector & Silvers, Randy, 2002. "Informed principal, moral hazard, and the value of a more informative technology," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 74(3), pages 291-300, February.

Citations

Many of the citations below have been collected in an experimental project, CitEc, where a more detailed citation analysis can be found. These are citations from works listed in RePEc that could be analyzed mechanically. So far, only a minority of all works could be analyzed. See under "Corrections" how you can help improve the citation analysis.

Working papers

  1. Hector Chade & Randolph Silvers, "undated". "Informed Principal, Moral Hazard, and the Value of a More Informative Technology," Working Papers 2133302, Department of Economics, W. P. Carey School of Business, Arizona State University.

    Cited by:

    1. Tröger, Thomas & Mylovanov, Timofiy, 2012. "Mechanism design by an informed principal: the quasi-linear private-values case," Working Papers 12-14, University of Mannheim, Department of Economics.
    2. Thomas Troeger & Tymofiy Mylovanov, 2010. "Optimal Auction Design and Irrelevance of Privacy of Information," 2010 Meeting Papers 1039, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    3. Ishiguro, Shingo, 2003. "Comparing allocations under asymmetric information: Coase Theorem revisited," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 80(1), pages 67-71, July.
    4. Nicholas Charles Bedard, 2017. "Contracts in informed-principal problems with moral hazard," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 5(1), pages 21-34, April.
    5. Bedard, Nicholas C., 2017. "The strategically ignorant principal," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 102(C), pages 548-561.
    6. Marino, Anthony M., 2014. "Transparency in agency: The constant elasticity case and extensions," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 33(C), pages 9-21.
    7. Heiko Karle & Christian Staat, 2013. "Signaling Quality with Initially Reduced Royalty Rates," Working Papers ECARES ECARES 2013-44, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
    8. Wagner, Christoph & Mylovanov, Tymofiy & Tröger, Thomas, 2015. "Informed-principal problem with moral hazard, risk neutrality, and no limited liability," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 159(PA), pages 280-289.
    9. Silvers, Randy, 2012. "The value of information in a principal–agent model with moral hazard: The ex post contracting case," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 74(1), pages 352-365.
    10. Mylovanov, Timofiy & Tröger, Thomas, 2012. "Informed principal problems in generalized private values environments," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 7(3), September.

Articles

  1. Silvers, Randy, 2012. "The value of information in a principal–agent model with moral hazard: The ex post contracting case," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 74(1), pages 352-365.

    Cited by:

    1. Nicholas Charles Bedard, 2017. "Contracts in informed-principal problems with moral hazard," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 5(1), pages 21-34, April.
    2. Bedard, Nicholas C., 2017. "The strategically ignorant principal," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 102(C), pages 548-561.
    3. Marino, Anthony M., 2014. "Transparency in agency: The constant elasticity case and extensions," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 33(C), pages 9-21.

  2. Chade, Hector & Silvers, Randy, 2002. "Informed principal, moral hazard, and the value of a more informative technology," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 74(3), pages 291-300, February.
    See citations under working paper version above.

More information

Research fields, statistics, top rankings, if available.

Statistics

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Co-authorship network on CollEc

NEP Fields

NEP is an announcement service for new working papers, with a weekly report in each of many fields. This author has had 2 papers announced in NEP. These are the fields, ordered by number of announcements, along with their dates. If the author is listed in the directory of specialists for this field, a link is also provided.
  1. NEP-EFF: Efficiency & Productivity (1) 2014-05-24
  2. NEP-HRM: Human Capital & Human Resource Management (1) 2014-05-24
  3. NEP-SPO: Sports & Economics (1) 2014-05-24

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