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Wirtschaftskrise und Staatsbankrott: Sind auch die Industrieländer bedroht?

Author

Listed:
  • Busch, Berthold
  • Jäger-Ambrożewicz, Manfred
  • Matthes, Jürgen

Abstract

Im Zuge der aktuellen Weltwirtschaftskrise hat sich gezeigt, dass auch entwickelte Volkswirtschaften dem Risiko von Staatsbankrotten ausgesetzt sein können. Diese Gefahr wird hier eingehend analysiert. Dabei stehen vor allem die Staaten in Süd- sowie in Mittel- und Osteuropa im Fokus. Eingehend beleuchtet werden aber auch die USA. Staatsbankrotte – direkte oder indirekte – sind kein neues Phänomen. Die internationale Staatengemeinschaft hat es bislang aber nicht geschafft, für solche Fälle ein geregeltes Verfahren zu installieren. Auch die mit dem Maastrichter Vertrag über die Europäische Union und dem Stabilitäts- und Wachstumspakt geschaffenen Regelungen konnten eine Situation, wie sie im Falle Griechenlands entstanden ist, nicht verhindern. Die Europäische Währungsunion (EWU) steht vor einem Dilemma: Zum einen soll Moral Hazard verhindert werden, zum anderen will die Politik keinen Mitgliedstaat der EWU pleitegehen lassen. Um Schäden für den Integrationsgedanken der Europäischen Union zu vermeiden, ist es erforderlich, den Internationalen Währungsfonds (IWF) in konkrete Hilfsmaßnahmen einzubinden.

Suggested Citation

  • Busch, Berthold & Jäger-Ambrożewicz, Manfred & Matthes, Jürgen, 2010. "Wirtschaftskrise und Staatsbankrott: Sind auch die Industrieländer bedroht?," IW-Analysen, Institut der deutschen Wirtschaft (IW) / German Economic Institute, volume 62, number 62.
  • Handle: RePEc:zbw:iwkana:62
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Kenneth Rogoff & Jeromin Zettelmeyer, 2002. "Bankruptcy Procedures for Sovereigns: A History of Ideas, 1976-2001," IMF Staff Papers, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 49(3), pages 1-8.
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