Regulating gasoline retail markets: The case of Germany
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References listed on IDEAS
- Suvankulov, Farrukh & Lau, Marco Chi Keung & Ogucu, Fatma, 2012. "Price regulation and relative price convergence: Evidence from the retail gasoline market in Canada," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 40(C), pages 325-334.
- Havranek, Tomas & Irsova, Zuzana & Janda, Karel, 2012.
"Demand for gasoline is more price-inelastic than commonly thought,"
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- Havranek, Tomas & Irsova, Zuzana & Janda, Karel, 2011. "Demand for gasoline is more price-inelastic than commonly thought," Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley, Working Paper Series qt0m94j50t, Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics, UC Berkeley.
- Tomáš Havránek & Zuzana Iršová & Karel Janda, 2011. "Demand for Gasoline Is More Price-Inelastic than Commonly Thought," Working Papers IES 2011/10, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, revised Mar 2011.
- Haucap, Justus & Müller, Hans Christian, 2012. "The Effects of Gasoline Price Regulations: Experimental Evidence," DICE Discussion Papers 47, University of Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE).
- Snorre Kverndokk & Knut Einar Rosendahl, 2013. "Effects of Transport Regulation on the Oil Market: Does Market Power Matter?," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 115(3), pages 662-694, July.
- Zhongmin Wang, 2009. "(Mixed) Strategy in Oligopoly Pricing: Evidence from Gasoline Price Cycles Before and Under a Timing Regulation," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 117(6), pages 987-1030, December.
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CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Thomas Wein, 2014. "Preventing Margin Squeeze: An Unsolvable Puzzle for Competition Policy? The Case of the German Gasoline Market," Working Paper Series in Economics 309, University of Lüneburg, Institute of Economics.
More about this item
Keywordsgasoline retail market; regulation; market structure and antitrust; collusion;
- Q48 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Energy - - - Government Policy
- D42 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Monopoly
- D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
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