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The impact of fiscal dominance on macroeconomic performance in Sierra Leone: a DSGE simulation approach

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  • Barrie, Mohamed Samba
  • Jackson, Emerson Abraham

Abstract

This study delves into the repercussions of fiscal policies, particularly those marked by high expenditure financed by monetary means, on key macroeconomic indicators in Sierra Leone. Employing a Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) model, the analysis illuminates how shocks in one variable ripple through the entire economic system over time. The analysis indicates that high levels of domestic borrowing and monetary financing in the medium-term crowd out private-sector investment hurt growth, and reduce government tax revenues, thereby reducing the government's capacity to invest in public goods and services. Furthermore, it demonstrates that this phenomenon leads to an endless "borrow-to-finance debts expenditures spiral" and creates more debt, worsens macro conditions, and exacerbates fiscal dominance. The paper recommends that policymakers manage Sierra Leone's fiscal trilemma, i.e., high development spending needs, high debt burden, and a low revenue base, not by taking on more debt and relying on monetary financing, but rather by expanding the economy's export capacity, harmonizing fiscal expenditures, and gradually expanding the domestic revenue base. Moreover, to prevent fiscal dominance from becoming systemic in the medium to long term, the research also recommends adhering to the Bank of Sierra Leone 2019 Act, which permits the Bank to cover temporary government deficits at no more than 5% of actual domestic revenue, excluding private receipts in the previous year. In sum, this study underscores the intricate interplay between fiscal policies and macroeconomic stability in Sierra Leone, offering a roadmap for policymakers to navigate the complexities of fiscal and monetary dynamics in the pursuit of enduring economic prosperity.

Suggested Citation

  • Barrie, Mohamed Samba & Jackson, Emerson Abraham, 2022. "The impact of fiscal dominance on macroeconomic performance in Sierra Leone: a DSGE simulation approach," EconStor Open Access Articles and Book Chapters, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, vol. 22(1), pages 1-33.
  • Handle: RePEc:zbw:espost:281804
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    3. Nissan Liviatan, 2003. "Fiscal Dominance and Monetary Dominance in the Israeli Monetary Experience," Bank of Israel Working Papers 2003.17, Bank of Israel.
    4. Ibrahima Diallo & Isatou Mendy, 2018. "Fiscal Dominance In The West African Monetary Zone: An Empirical Investigation," West African Journal of Monetary and Economic Integration, West African Monetary Institute, vol. 18(1), pages 21-46, June.
    5. Kydland, Finn E & Prescott, Edward C, 1977. "Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 85(3), pages 473-491, June.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Fiscal Dominance; macroeconomic variables; Sierra Leone; DSGE Framework; Monetary Financing;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E3 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles
    • E5 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit
    • H6 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt
    • O2 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Development Planning and Policy

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