IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/zbw/econso/155808.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Collective action problems in monitoring managers the Enron case as a systemic problem

Author

Listed:
  • Gourevitch, Peter

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Suggested Citation

  • Gourevitch, Peter, 2002. "Collective action problems in monitoring managers the Enron case as a systemic problem," economic sociology. perspectives and conversations, Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies, vol. 3(3), pages 3-16.
    • Handle: RePEc:zbw:econso:155808
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/155808/1/vol03-no03-a1.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W, 1997. "A Survey of Corporate Governance," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 52(2), pages 737-783, June.
    2. Marco Becht & Colin Mayer, 2002. "Corporate control in Europe," Revue d'économie politique, Dalloz, vol. 112(4), pages 471-498.
    3. Jensen, Michael C, 1986. "Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance, and Takeovers," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(2), pages 323-329, May.
    4. Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez‐De‐Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, 1999. "Corporate Ownership Around the World," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 54(2), pages 471-517, April.
    5. Barca, Fabrizio & Becht, Marco (ed.), 2002. "The Control of Corporate Europe," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780199257539.
    6. Jensen, Michael C. & Meckling, William H., 1976. "Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 305-360, October.
    7. Aguilera, Ruth & Jackson, Gregory, 2002. "Hybridization and heterogeneity across national models of corporate governance," economic sociology. perspectives and conversations, Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies, vol. 3(2), pages 17-25.
    8. Gourevitch, Peter & Bohn, Roger & McKendrick, David, 2000. "Globalization of Production: Insights from the Hard Disk Drive Industry," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 28(2), pages 301-317, February.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. François-Régis Puyou, 2014. "Ordering collective performance manipulation practices: How do leaders manipulate financial reporting figures in conglomerates?," Post-Print hal-01069276, HAL.
    2. Angela Maddaloni & Darren Pain, 2004. "Corporate ‘excesses’ and financial market dynamics," Occasional Paper Series 17, European Central Bank.
    3. Maddaloni, Angela & Pain, Darren, 2004. "Corporate "excesses" and financial market dynamics," Occasional Paper Series 17, European Central Bank.
    4. Puyou, François-Régis, 2014. "Ordering collective performance manipulation practices: How do leaders manipulate financial reporting figures in conglomerates?," CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES ON ACCOUNTING, Elsevier, vol. 25(6), pages 469-488.
    5. Sinclair, Timothy J., 2010. "Credit rating agencies and the global financial crisis," economic sociology. perspectives and conversations, Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies, vol. 12(1), pages 4-9.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Schmid, Thomas & Ampenberger, Markus & Kaserer, Christoph & Achleitner, Ann-Kristin, 2010. "Controlling shareholders and payout policy: do founding families have a special 'taste for dividends'?," CEFS Working Paper Series 2010-01, Technische Universität München (TUM), Center for Entrepreneurial and Financial Studies (CEFS).
    2. Isabel Gutierrez & Jordi Surroca, 2014. "Revisiting corporate governance through the lens of the Spanish evidence," Journal of Management & Governance, Springer;Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA), vol. 18(4), pages 989-1017, November.
    3. Thomsen, Steen & Pedersen, Torben & Kvist, Hans Kurt, 2006. "Blockholder ownership: Effects on firm value in market and control based governance systems," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 12(2), pages 246-269, January.
    4. Mike Burkart & Samuel Lee, 2008. "One Share - One Vote: the Theory," Review of Finance, European Finance Association, vol. 12(1), pages 1-49.
    5. Céline Du Boys, 2009. "Is payout policy part of the corporate governance system? The case of France," Post-Print hal-01290737, HAL.
    6. Ferrell, Allen & Liang, Hao & Renneboog, Luc, 2016. "Socially responsible firms," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 122(3), pages 585-606.
    7. Stavros E. Arvanitis & Theodoros V. Stamatopoulos & Dimitris Terzakis, 2018. "Is There a Non-linear Relationship of Market Value with Cash and Ownership?," SPOUDAI Journal of Economics and Business, SPOUDAI Journal of Economics and Business, University of Piraeus, vol. 68(1), pages 3-25, January-M.
    8. du Jardin, Philippe & Séverin, Eric, 2011. "Dividend policy," MPRA Paper 44382, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    9. Koke, Jens, 2002. "Determinants of acquisition and failure: evidence from corporate Germany," Structural Change and Economic Dynamics, Elsevier, vol. 13(4), pages 457-484, December.
    10. Amess, Kevin & Banerji, Sanjay & Lampousis, Athanasios, 2015. "Corporate cash holdings: Causes and consequences," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 42(C), pages 421-433.
    11. Son Le & Mark Kroll & Bruce Walters, 2010. "The impact of institutional changes on corporate governance mechanisms in transition economies," Journal of Management & Governance, Springer;Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA), vol. 14(2), pages 91-114, May.
    12. de La Bruslerie, Hubert, 2016. "Does debt curb controlling shareholders' private benefits? Modelling in a contingent claim framework," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 58(C), pages 263-282.
    13. Jayesh Kumar, 2003. "Ownership Structure and Corporate Firm Performance," Finance 0304004, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    14. Tristan Auvray & Olivier Brossard, 2012. "Too Dispersed to Monitor? Ownership Dispersion, Monitoring, and the Prediction of Bank Distress," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 44(4), pages 685-714, June.
    15. Jun-Koo Kang & Jungmin Kim, 2020. "Do Family Firms Invest More than Nonfamily Firms in Employee-Friendly Policies?," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 66(3), pages 1300-1324, March.
    16. Jian Zhang, 2018. "Public Governance and Corporate Fraud: Evidence from the Recent Anti-corruption Campaign in China," Journal of Business Ethics, Springer, vol. 148(2), pages 375-396, March.
    17. Erwan Morellec & Boris Nikolov & Norman Schürhoff, 2018. "Agency Conflicts around the World," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 31(11), pages 4232-4287.
    18. Naeem Tabassum & Satwinder Singh, 2020. "Corporate Governance and Organisational Performance," Springer Books, Springer, number 978-3-030-48527-6, July.
    19. Chaiyasit Anuchitworawong, 2010. "The Value of Principles-Based Governance Practices and the Attenuation of Information Asymmetry," Asia-Pacific Financial Markets, Springer;Japanese Association of Financial Economics and Engineering, vol. 17(2), pages 171-207, June.
    20. Robert Chirinko & Hans Van Ees & Harry Garretsen & Elmer Sterken, 2004. "Investor Protections and Concentrated Ownership: Assessing Corporate Control Mechanisms in the Netherlands," German Economic Review, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 5(2), pages 119-138, May.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:zbw:econso:155808. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/mpigfde.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.