IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/ysm/ypfsfc/231111.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

The Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility (TALF) (U.S. GFC)

Author

Abstract

In the fall of 2008, the securitization market, which was the major provider of credit for consumers and small businesses, came to a near halt. Investors in this market abandoned not only the residential mortgage-backed securities that triggered the financial crisis but also consumer and business asset-backed securities (ABS), which had a long track record of strong performance, and commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS). Also, the unprecedented widening of spreads for these securities rendered new issuance uneconomical, and the shutdown of the securitization market threatened to exacerbate the downturn in the economy. On November 25, 2008, the Federal Reserve (the Fed) thus announced the Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility (TALF). TALF was launched on March 3, 2009, to help stabilize funding markets for issuers in the securitization market. The TALF extended term loans, collateralized by the securities, to buyers of certain high-quality asset-backed securities. By reopening the ABS market, the Fed intended to ultimately support the provision of credit to consumers and small businesses. Instead of directly participating in the securitization market, the Fed encouraged private investors to do so by providing them with liquidity and only took risk in the loss of the value of ABS.: In aggregate, the Fed issued 2,152 loans, totaling $71.1 billion. The volume of outstanding loans peaked in March 2010 at $48.2 billion. Loans secured by nonmortgage ABS totaled $59 billion, and loans secured by legacy CMBS totaled $12 billion. The original expiration date for the TALF of December 31, 2009, was extended to March 31, 2010, for loans against ABS and legacy CMBS, and until June 30, 2010, for loans against newly issued CMBS. On October 29, 2014, the final outstanding TALF loan was repaid in full, and in the following month, a total of $745.7 million in accumulated fees and income was paid to the Treasury (90%) and the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (10%).:

Suggested Citation

  • Rhee, June, 2020. "The Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility (TALF) (U.S. GFC)," Journal of Financial Crises, Yale Program on Financial Stability (YPFS), vol. 2(3), pages 281-306, April.
  • Handle: RePEc:ysm:ypfsfc:231111
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://elischolar.library.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1114&context=journal-of-financial-crises
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Brian P. Sack, 2010. "Reflections on the TALF and the Federal Reserve's role as liquidity provider," Speech 26, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
    2. Campbell, Sean & Covitz, Daniel & Nelson, William & Pence, Karen, 2011. "Securitization markets and central banking: An evaluation of the term asset-backed securities loan facility," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 58(5), pages 518-531.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Metrick, Andrew, 2020. "Market Liquidity Programs: GFC and Before," Journal of Financial Crises, Yale Program on Financial Stability (YPFS), vol. 2(3), pages 41-70, April.
    2. Claudia Buch & Catherine Koch & Michael Koetter, 2016. "Crises and rescues: liquidity transmission through international banks," BIS Working Papers 576, Bank for International Settlements.
    3. Efraim Benmelech & Ralf R. Meisenzahl & Rodney Ramcharan, 2017. "The Real Effects of Liquidity During the Financial Crisis: Evidence from Automobiles," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 132(1), pages 317-365.
    4. Mark A. Carlson & Burcu Duygan-Bump & William R. Nelson, 2015. "Why Do We Need Both Liquidity Regulations and a Lender of Last Resort? A Perspective from Federal Reserve Lending during the 2007-09 U.S. Financial Crisis," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2015-11, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    5. Tobias Adrian & Adam B. Ashcraft & Hayley Boesky & Zoltan Pozsar, 2013. "Shadow banking," Economic Policy Review, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, issue Dec, pages 1-16.
      • Tobias Adrian & Adam B. Ashcraft & Hayley Boesky & Zoltan Pozsar, 2010. "Shadow banking," Staff Reports 458, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
    6. Abdelsalam, Omneya & Elnahass, Marwa & Ahmed, Habib & Williams, Julian, 2022. "Asset securitizations and bank stability: Evidence from different banking systems," Global Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 51(C).
    7. Gaballo, Gaetano & Marimon, Ramon, 2021. "Breaking the spell with credit-easing: Self-confirming credit crises in competitive search economies," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 119(C), pages 1-20.
    8. O'Hara, Maureen & Zhou, Xing (Alex), 2021. "Anatomy of a liquidity crisis: Corporate bonds in the COVID-19 crisis," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 142(1), pages 46-68.
    9. Scott Brave & Hesna Genay, 2011. "Federal Reserve policies and financial market conditions during the crisis," Working Paper Series WP-2011-04, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.
    10. Adam B. Ashcraft & Allan M. Malz & Zoltan Pozsar, 2012. "The Federal Reserve’s Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility," Economic Policy Review, Federal Reserve Bank of New York, vol. 18(Nov), pages 29-66.
    11. Nelson, Edward, 2013. "Friedman's monetary economics in practice," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 38(C), pages 59-83.
    12. Li, Xiao-Lin & Xie, Pinyi & Ding, Hui & Si, Deng-Kui, 2023. "Central bank lending facility and investment efficiency of non-SOEs: evidence from China," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 126(C).
    13. Alyssa G. Anderson, 2015. "Ambiguity in Securitization Markets," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2015-33, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    14. repec:bin:bpeajo:v:49:y:2019:i:2018-01:p:347-428 is not listed on IDEAS
    15. Claudio Borio & Anna Zabai, 2018. "Unconventional monetary policies: a re-appraisal," Chapters, in: Peter Conti-Brown & Rosa M. Lastra (ed.), Research Handbook on Central Banking, chapter 20, pages 398-444, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    16. León, Carlos & Machado, Clara & Sarmiento, Miguel, 2018. "Identifying central bank liquidity super-spreaders in interbank funds networks," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 35(C), pages 75-92.
    17. Elizabeth C. Klee & Chaehee Shin, 2020. "Post-crisis Signals in Securitization: Evidence from Auto ABS," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2020-042, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    18. Contessi, Silvio & De Pace, Pierangelo & Guidolin, Massimo, 2014. "How did the financial crisis alter the correlations of U.S. yield spreads?," Journal of Empirical Finance, Elsevier, vol. 28(C), pages 362-385.
    19. Elizabeth Caviness & Ankur Goyal & Woojung Park & Asani Sarkar, 2020. "COVID Response: The Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility," Staff Reports 979, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
    20. Acharya, Viral V. & Fleming, Michael J. & Hrung, Warren B. & Sarkar, Asani, 2017. "Dealer financial conditions and lender-of-last-resort facilities," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 123(1), pages 81-107.
    21. Anderson, Alyssa Gray, 2019. "Ambiguity in securitization markets," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 102(C), pages 231-255.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    asset-backed securities; ABS; commercial mortgage-backed securities; CMBS; securitization; loan; lending;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G01 - Financial Economics - - General - - - Financial Crises
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ysm:ypfsfc:231111. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: the person in charge (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/smyalus.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.