IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/wly/jmoncb/v56y2024i7p1611-1643.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Trade‐Off Theory for Dual Holders

Author

Listed:
  • SNORRE LINDSET
  • GUTTORM NYGÅRD
  • SVEIN‐ARNE PERSSON

Abstract

A dual holder simultaneously owns (private) debt and equity in the same firm. Private debt has a tax advantage, a positive cashflow, which incentivizes its use. This cashflow leads to a lower net cost of debt, which again reduces default risk as well as the cost of external debt. The usual trade‐off between tax benefits and bankruptcy costs is altered. Debt priority affects both financing and default decisions. We find that an enterprise‐value maximizing firm should issue senior, external debt and junior, private debt, rather than debt with pari‐passu priority. Our analysis further highlights that tax authorities can effectively curtail the tax‐motivated use of private debt through straightforward measures.

Suggested Citation

  • Snorre Lindset & Guttorm Nygård & Svein‐Arne Persson, 2024. "Trade‐Off Theory for Dual Holders," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 56(7), pages 1611-1643, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:jmoncb:v:56:y:2024:i:7:p:1611-1643
    DOI: 10.1111/jmcb.13128
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/jmcb.13128
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1111/jmcb.13128?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Bodnaruk, Andriy & Rossi, Marco, 2016. "Dual ownership, returns, and voting in mergers," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 120(1), pages 58-80.
    2. Buettner, Thiess & Overesch, Michael & Schreiber, Ulrich & Wamser, Georg, 2009. "Taxation and capital structure choice--Evidence from a panel of German multinationals," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 105(3), pages 309-311, December.
    3. Black, Fischer & Cox, John C, 1976. "Valuing Corporate Securities: Some Effects of Bond Indenture Provisions," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 31(2), pages 351-367, May.
    4. Leland, Hayne E, 1994. "Corporate Debt Value, Bond Covenants, and Optimal Capital Structure," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 49(4), pages 1213-1252, September.
    5. Ilya A. Strebulaev, 2007. "Do Tests of Capital Structure Theory Mean What They Say?," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 62(4), pages 1747-1787, August.
    6. Wei Jiang & Kai Li & Pei Shao, 2010. "When Shareholders Are Creditors: Effects of the Simultaneous Holding of Equity and Debt by Non-commercial Banking Institutions," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 23(10), pages 3595-3637, October.
    7. Christensen, Peter Ove & Flor, Christian Riis & Lando, David & Miltersen, Kristian R., 2014. "Dynamic capital structure with callable debt and debt renegotiations," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 29(C), pages 644-661.
    8. Pindyck, Robert S, 1993. "A Note on Competitive Investment under Uncertainty," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(1), pages 273-277, March.
    9. Miguel Antón & Luca X Lin, 2020. "The Mutual Friend: Dual Holder Monitoring and Firm Investment Efficiency," The Review of Corporate Finance Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 9(1), pages 81-115.
    10. repec:bla:jfinan:v:44:y:1989:i:1:p:19-40 is not listed on IDEAS
    11. Francis, Bill & Teng, Haimeng & Wang, Ying & Wu, Qiang, 2022. "The effect of shareholder-debtholder conflicts on corporate tax aggressiveness: Evidence from dual holders," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 138(C).
    12. Yongqiang Chu, 2018. "Shareholder-Creditor Conflict and Payout Policy: Evidence from Mergers between Lenders and Shareholders," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 31(8), pages 3098-3121.
    13. Chava, Sudheer & Wang, Rui & Zou, Hong, 2019. "Covenants, Creditors’ Simultaneous Equity Holdings, and Firm Investment Policies," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 54(2), pages 481-512, April.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Stefano Bonini & Ali Taatian, 2023. "Dual holding and bank risk," The Financial Review, Eastern Finance Association, vol. 58(4), pages 735-763, November.
    2. Yang, Huan, 2021. "Institutional dual holdings and risk-shifting: Evidence from corporate innovation," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 70(C).
    3. Francis, Bill & Teng, Haimeng & Wang, Ying & Wu, Qiang, 2022. "The effect of shareholder-debtholder conflicts on corporate tax aggressiveness: Evidence from dual holders," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 138(C).
    4. Tao Chen & Li Zhang & Qifei Zhu, 2023. "Dual Ownership and Risk-Taking Incentives in Managerial Compensation," Review of Finance, European Finance Association, vol. 27(5), pages 1823-1857.
    5. Ulrich Hege & Pierre Mella-Barral, 2019. "Bond Exchange Offers or Collective Action Clauses?," Finance, Presses universitaires de Grenoble, vol. 40(3), pages 77-119.
    6. Antill, Samuel & Grenadier, Steven R., 2019. "Optimal capital structure and bankruptcy choice: Dynamic bargaining versus liquidation," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 133(1), pages 198-224.
    7. Ono, Arito & Suzuki, Katsushi & Uesugi, Iichiro, 2024. "When banks become pure creditors: The effects of declining shareholding by Japanese banks on bank lending and firms’ risk-taking," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 73(C).
    8. Tang, Tian & Xu, Liang & Yan, Xinyan & Yang, Haoyi, 2022. "Simultaneous debt–equity holdings and corporate tax avoidance," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 72(C).
    9. Nguyen, Hien T. & Phan, Hieu V. & Vo, Hong, 2023. "Agency problems and corporate social responsibility: Evidence from shareholder-creditor mergers," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 90(C).
    10. Shibata, Takashi & Tian, Yuan, 2010. "Reorganization strategies and securities valuation under asymmetric information," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 19(3), pages 412-426, June.
    11. Andriy Bodnaruk & Marco Rossi, 2021. "Shareholders as Creditors of First Resort," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 67(3), pages 1737-1757, March.
    12. Hui Chen & Jianjun Miao & Neng Wang, 2010. "Entrepreneurial Finance and Nondiversifiable Risk," The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 23(12), pages 4348-4388, December.
    13. Attaoui, Sami & Cao, Wenbin & Duan, Xiaoman & Liu, Hening, 2021. "Optimal capital structure, ambiguity aversion, and leverage puzzles," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 129(C).
    14. Dumitrescu, Ariadna, 2007. "Valuation of defaultable bonds and debt restructuring," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 13(1), pages 94-111, March.
    15. Frantz, Pascal & Instefjord, Norvald, 2019. "Debt overhang and non-distressed debt restructuring," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 37(C), pages 75-88.
    16. Hassan Naqvi, 2004. "The Valuation of Corporate Debt with Default Risk," Finance 0410010, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    17. Zhiguo He & Wei Xiong, 2012. "Rollover Risk and Credit Risk," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 67(2), pages 391-430, April.
    18. R. Miniaci & M. Parisi & P. Panteghini, 2014. "Debt shifting in Europe," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 21(3), pages 397-435, June.
    19. Pawlina, Grzegorz, 2010. "Underinvestment, capital structure and strategic debt restructuring," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 16(5), pages 679-702, December.
    20. Liu, Bo & Liu, Yang & Peng, Juan & Yang, Jinqiang, 2017. "Optimal capital structure and credit spread under incomplete information," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 49(C), pages 596-611.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:wly:jmoncb:v:56:y:2024:i:7:p:1611-1643. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Wiley Content Delivery (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/journal.asp?ref=0022-2879 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.