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The Mutual Friend: Dual Holder Monitoring and Firm Investment Efficiency

Author

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  • Miguel Antón
  • Luca X Lin

Abstract

We investigate the influence of simultaneous equity holdings by creditors (dual holders) on investment efficiency. Such creditors have stronger incentives and power to monitor firm investment as they have cash flow and control rights from both debt and equity sides. We provide evidence that dual holders, particularly noncommercial bank dual holders, significantly mitigate overinvestment. For high growth firms and those subject to debt overhang, dual holders also alleviate underinvestment. Equity value increases at the presence of dual holders. Our results indicate that by improving firm investment efficiency, dual holders not only make creditor investments safer but also create value for shareholders.Received March 26, 2019; editorial decision September 17, 2019 by Editor Isil Erel.

Suggested Citation

  • Miguel Antón & Luca X Lin, 2020. "The Mutual Friend: Dual Holder Monitoring and Firm Investment Efficiency," The Review of Corporate Finance Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 9(1), pages 81-115.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:rcorpf:v:9:y:2020:i:1:p:81-115.
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1093/rcfs/cfz010
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Lin, Luca X., 2022. "Taking no chances: Lender concentration and corporate acquisitions," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 76(C).
    2. Tang, Tian & Xu, Liang & Yan, Xinyan & Yang, Haoyi, 2022. "Simultaneous debt–equity holdings and corporate tax avoidance," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 72(C).
    3. James R. Barth & Sunghoon Joo & Kang‐Bok Lee, 2022. "Bank–client cross‐ownership of bank stocks: A network analysis," Journal of Financial Research, Southern Finance Association;Southwestern Finance Association, vol. 45(2), pages 280-312, June.
    4. Lim, Jesslyn & Do, Viet & Vu, Tram, 2022. "The effect of lenders’ dual holding on loan contract design: Evidence from performance pricing provisions," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 137(C).
    5. Francis, Bill & Teng, Haimeng & Wang, Ying & Wu, Qiang, 2022. "The effect of shareholder-debtholder conflicts on corporate tax aggressiveness: Evidence from dual holders," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 138(C).
    6. David K. Ding & Christo Ferreira & Vu Minh Ngo & Phuc V. Nguyen & Udomsak Wongchoti, 2024. "Corporate social responsibility and myopic management practice: Is there a link?," Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, Springer, vol. 62(1), pages 271-308, January.
    7. Renjie, Rex Wang & Verwijmeren, Patrick & Xia, Shuo, 2022. "Corporate governance benefits of mutual fund cooperation," IWH Discussion Papers 21/2022, Halle Institute for Economic Research (IWH).
    8. Stefano Bonini & Ali Taatian, 2023. "Dual holding and bank risk," The Financial Review, Eastern Finance Association, vol. 58(4), pages 735-763, November.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    G23; G31; G34;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G23 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Non-bank Financial Institutions; Financial Instruments; Institutional Investors
    • G31 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Capital Budgeting; Fixed Investment and Inventory Studies
    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance

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