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Reorganization strategies and securities valuation under asymmetric information

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  • Shibata, Takashi
  • Tian, Yuan

Abstract

This paper examines optimal reorganization strategies during financial distress and securities valuation under asymmetric information. We model strategic interactions between debtholders and equityholders in a game-theoretic setting that can accommodate the varying bargaining powers of the two claimants. Two reorganization strategies are considered: Chapter 11 (debt-equity swap) and private workout (strategic debt service). Using Chapter 11 as a costly state verification device, we characterize in equilibrium which firms choose Chapter 11 and which choose private workout. In particular, we show how the bank's belief about the type of firm evolves by observation of reorganization strategies. We also derive closed-form solutions to both the equity and debt valuation problems under asymmetric information and show that credit spreads increase with the degrees of asymmetric information.

Suggested Citation

  • Shibata, Takashi & Tian, Yuan, 2010. "Reorganization strategies and securities valuation under asymmetric information," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 19(3), pages 412-426, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:reveco:v:19:y:2010:i:3:p:412-426
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    1. Gan, Liu & Luo, Pengfei & Yang, Zhaojun, 2016. "Real option, debt maturity and equity default swaps under negotiation," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, vol. 18(C), pages 278-284.
    2. Shibata, Takashi & Tian, Yuan, 2012. "Debt reorganization strategies with complete verification under information asymmetry," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 22(1), pages 141-160.
    3. Christophe J. Godlewski, 2019. "Debt Renegotiation and the Design of Financial Contracts," Journal of Financial Services Research, Springer;Western Finance Association, vol. 55(2), pages 191-215, June.
    4. Huang, Jiang-Chuan & Huang, Chin-Sheng & You, Chun-Fan, 2015. "Bank relationships and the likelihood of filing for reorganization," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 35(C), pages 278-291.
    5. Moraux, Franck & Silaghi, Florina, 2014. "Inside debt renegotiation: Optimal debt reduction, timing, and the number of rounds," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 27(C), pages 269-295.
    6. Lin, Hsuan-Chu & Chou, Ting-Kai & Cheng, Jia-Chi, 2011. "Does market misvaluation drive post-acquisition underperformance in stock deals?," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 20(4), pages 690-706, October.
    7. Shibata, Takashi & Wong, Kit Pong, 2019. "Investment under uncertainty with variable costly reversibility," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 59(C), pages 14-28.

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