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Pricing Misperceptions: Explaining Pricing Structure in the Cell Phone Service Market

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  • Oren Bar‐Gill
  • Rebecca Stone

Abstract

The cell phone service market is an economically significant market that has substantially increased consumer welfare. In this article, we focus on the pricing of cell phone service. The common pricing structure is a three‐part tariff comprising: (1) a monthly charge; (2) a fixed number of minutes that the monthly charge pays for; and (3) a per‐minute price for minutes beyond the plan limit. Using a unique data set of consumer‐level monthly billing and usage information for 3,730 consumers at a single wireless provider, we evaluate the explanatory power of three accounts of the three‐part tariff: a rational choice account; a behavioral account proposed by Grubb (2009) that supposes that consumers are overconfident in their estimates of their future usage; and a second behavioral account that posits that some consumers overestimate their average future usage while others underestimate it. We quantify the mistakes that consumers make in plan choice and, extrapolating from our data, estimate that these mistakes cost U.S. consumers over $13 billion annually. Our analysis suggests that regulation mandating the disclosure of product use information can be socially desirable in the cell phone service market.

Suggested Citation

  • Oren Bar‐Gill & Rebecca Stone, 2012. "Pricing Misperceptions: Explaining Pricing Structure in the Cell Phone Service Market," Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 9(3), pages 430-456, September.
  • Handle: RePEc:wly:empleg:v:9:y:2012:i:3:p:430-456
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1740-1461.2012.01258.x
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Michael D. Grubb, 2009. "Selling to Overconfident Consumers," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 99(5), pages 1770-1807, December.
    2. Michael D. Grubb & Matthew Osborne, 2015. "Cellular Service Demand: Biased Beliefs, Learning, and Bill Shock," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 105(1), pages 234-271, January.
    3. Xavier Gabaix & David Laibson, 2018. "Shrouded attributes, consumer myopia and information suppression in competitive markets," Chapters, in: Victor J. Tremblay & Elizabeth Schroeder & Carol Horton Tremblay (ed.), Handbook of Behavioral Industrial Organization, chapter 3, pages 40-74, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    4. Matthew Rabin, 2000. "Risk Aversion and Expected-Utility Theory: A Calibration Theorem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 68(5), pages 1281-1292, September.
    5. Stefano DellaVigna & Ulrike Malmendier, 2006. "Paying Not to Go to the Gym," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(3), pages 694-719, June.
    6. , & ,, 2008. "Consumer optimism and price discrimination," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 3(4), December.
    7. Eugenio J. Miravete, 2003. "Choosing the Wrong Calling Plan? Ignorance and Learning," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(1), pages 297-310, March.
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    Cited by:

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    3. Brendan Cushing-Daniels, 2020. "Rethinking Profit-Maximization in Second-Degree Price Discriminating Markets," Atlantic Economic Journal, Springer;International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 48(2), pages 223-235, June.
    4. Seunghee Han & Jooyong Jun & Eunjung Yeo, 2021. "In Pursuit of Sustainable Mobile Policy: A Study of Consumer Tariff Preferences under Uncertainty," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 13(2), pages 1-20, January.
    5. Alexander W. Cappelen & Stefan Meissner & Bertil Tungodden, 2025. "Cancel the Deal? An Experimental Study on the Exploitation of Irrational Consumers," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 71(5), pages 3983-3995, May.
    6. LL. M. Fabrizio Esposito, 2017. "A Dismal Reality: Behavioural Analysis and Consumer Policy," Journal of Consumer Policy, Springer, vol. 40(2), pages 193-216, June.
    7. Martins, Lurdes & Szrek, Helena, 2019. "The impact of the decision environment on consumer choice of mobile service plans: An experimental examination," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 56(C), pages 20-32.

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