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Competition in the Courtroom: When Does Expert Testimony Improve Jurors' Decisions?

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  • Cheryl Boudreau
  • Mathew D. McCubbins

Abstract

Many scholars lament the increasing complexity of jury trials and question whether the testimony of competing experts helps unsophisticated jurors to make informed decisions. In this article, we analyze experimentally the effects that the testimony of competing experts has on (1) sophisticated versus unsophisticated subjects' decisions and (2) subjects' decisions on difficult versus easy problems. Our results demonstrate that competing expert testimony, by itself, does not help unsophisticated subjects to behave as though they are sophisticated, nor does it help subjects make comparable decisions on difficult and easy problems. When we impose additional institutions (such as penalties for lying or a threat of verification) on the competing experts, we observe such dramatic improvements in unsophisticated subjects' decisions that the gap between their decisions and those of sophisticated subjects closes. We find similar results when the competing experts exchange reasons for why their statements may be correct. However, additional institutions and the experts' exchange of reasons are less effective at closing the gap between subjects' decisions on difficult versus easy problems.

Suggested Citation

  • Cheryl Boudreau & Mathew D. McCubbins, 2009. "Competition in the Courtroom: When Does Expert Testimony Improve Jurors' Decisions?," Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 6(4), pages 793-817, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:empleg:v:6:y:2009:i:4:p:793-817
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1740-1461.2009.01160.x
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    Cited by:

    1. Aimone, Jason A. & Hudja, Stanton & Law, Wilson & North, Charles M. & Ralston, Jason & Rentschler, Lucas, 2023. "An experimental exploration of reasonable doubt," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 212(C), pages 873-886.
    2. Albertazzi, Andrea & Ploner, Matteo & Vaccari, Federico, 2021. "Welfare in Experimental News Markets," SocArXiv 5j2w8, Center for Open Science.
    3. Dain C. Donelson & Justin J. Hopkins, 2016. "Large Market Declines and Securities Litigation: Implications for Disclosing Adverse Earnings News," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 62(11), pages 3183-3198, November.
    4. Albertazzi, Andrea & Ploner, Matteo & Vaccari, Federico, 2024. "Welfare and competition in expert advice markets," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 219(C), pages 74-103.
    5. repec:osf:socarx:5j2w8_v1 is not listed on IDEAS

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