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Correcting for transitory effects in RCTs: Evidence from the RAND Health Insurance Experiment

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  • Mona Balesh Abadi
  • Kevin Devereux
  • Farah Omran

Abstract

Temporary randomized controlled trials are susceptible to transitory effects that would not result from a permanent treatment. We find a large and statistically significant “deadline effect”—a surge in spending in the final treatment year—in the RAND Health Insurance Experiment, identified by random allocation to three‐ or five‐year enrolment terms. Participants facing lower coinsurance rates show larger spending surges. Partialing out the price–deadline interaction reduces in magnitude estimates of the permanent price elasticity of drug spending (and in some specifications of outpatient and supplies spending). This implies higher optimal coinsurance rates and illustrates the importance of experimental design to identifying parameters of interest in randomized controlled trials. Corriger les effets transitoires dans les essais contrôlés randomisés : Données probantes de l'expérience sur l'assurance‐maladie RAND. Les essais contrôlés randomisés temporaires sont vulnérables aux effets transitoires qui ne découleraient pas d'un traitement permanent. Nous constatons un grand « effet lié à l'échéance » statistiquement significatif – une recrudescence des dépenses au cours de la dernière année de traitement – dans l'expérience sur l'assurance‐maladie RAND, déterminé par la répartition aléatoire à des durées de participation de trois ou cinq ans. Les participants ayant des taux de coassurance inférieurs présentent des recrudescences des dépenses supérieures. Supprimer le biais de l'interaction entre le prix et l'échéance réduit la magnitude de l'estimation de l'élasticité permanente du prix des dépenses en médicaments (et pour certaines spécifications des dépenses en milieu ambulatoire et en fournitures). Cela laisse entendre des taux de coassurance optimaux et illustre l'importance du plan expérimental afin de déterminer les paramètres d'intérêt des essais contrôlés randomisés.

Suggested Citation

  • Mona Balesh Abadi & Kevin Devereux & Farah Omran, 2023. "Correcting for transitory effects in RCTs: Evidence from the RAND Health Insurance Experiment," Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 56(1), pages 288-305, February.
  • Handle: RePEc:wly:canjec:v:56:y:2023:i:1:p:288-305
    DOI: 10.1111/caje.12637
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    References listed on IDEAS

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