IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/wly/amposc/v48y2004i4p813-829.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

How Initiators End Their Wars: The Duration of Warfare and the Terms of Peace

Author

Listed:
  • Branislav L. Slantchev

Abstract

The new theories of endogenous war termination generally predict that initiators would tend to do badly the longer the war, that information acquired during the war would outweigh information available prior to its outbreak, that stronger initiators would be slower to update their estimates about the outcome, and that uncertainty would increase the expected duration of conflict. This article subjects these hypotheses to statistical testing by estimating time‐accelerated log‐logistic hazard models of duration and bootstrapped ordered probit models of outcome with a new data set of 104 interstate wars from 1816 to 1991. The Monte Carlo simulation results support the hypotheses and the substantive findings provide ample reason for continuing with this research agenda.

Suggested Citation

  • Branislav L. Slantchev, 2004. "How Initiators End Their Wars: The Duration of Warfare and the Terms of Peace," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 48(4), pages 813-829, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:wly:amposc:v:48:y:2004:i:4:p:813-829
    DOI: 10.1111/j.0092-5853.2004.00103.x
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0092-5853.2004.00103.x
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1111/j.0092-5853.2004.00103.x?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Alastair Smith & Allan C. Stam, 2004. "Bargaining and the Nature of War," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 48(6), pages 783-813, December.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Maxime Menuet & Petros G. Sekeris, 2021. "Overconfidence and conflict," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 59(4), pages 1483-1499, October.
    2. John Tyson Chatagnier, 2015. "Conflict bargaining as a signal to third parties," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 27(2), pages 237-268, April.
    3. Alastair Smith & Allan C. Stam, 2006. "Divergent Beliefs in “Bargaining and the Nature of Warâ€," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 50(4), pages 614-618, August.
    4. Montalvo, Jose G. & Reynal-Querol, Marta, 2007. "Ethnic polarization and the duration of civil wars," Policy Research Working Paper Series 4192, The World Bank.
    5. M. Christian Lehmann, 2020. "Aiding refugees, aiding peace?," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 22(5), pages 1687-1704, September.
    6. Paul F. Diehl, 2006. "Just a Phase?: Integrating Conflict Dynamics Over Time," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 23(3), pages 199-210, July.
    7. Nakao, Keisuke, 2022. "Democratic Victory and War Duration: Why Are Democracies Less Likely to Win Long Wars?," MPRA Paper 112849, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    8. Constantin Ruhe, 2021. "Impeding fatal violence through third-party diplomacy: The effect of mediation on conflict intensity," Journal of Peace Research, Peace Research Institute Oslo, vol. 58(4), pages 687-701, July.
    9. Yuri M. Zhukov, 2014. "Theory of Indiscriminate Violence," Working Paper 365551, Harvard University OpenScholar.
    10. Darren Filson & Suzanne Werner, 2007. "The Dynamics of Bargaining and War," International Interactions, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 33(1), pages 31-50, January.
    11. Beviá, Carmen & Corchón, Luis C., 2010. "Peace agreements without commitment," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 68(2), pages 469-487, March.
    12. Serhat Doğan & Kerim Keskin & Çağrı Sağlam, 2023. "Analyzing strategic behavior in a dynamic model of bargaining and war," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 140(3), pages 233-257, December.
    13. Vahabi,Mehrdad, 2019. "The Political Economy of Predation," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9781107591370, Enero-Abr.
    14. Richard Jordan, 2021. "Symbolic victories and strategic risk," Journal of Peace Research, Peace Research Institute Oslo, vol. 58(5), pages 973-985, September.
    15. Clara Ponsati & Santiago Sanchez-Pages, 2012. "Optimism and commitment: an elementary theory of bargaining and war," SERIEs: Journal of the Spanish Economic Association, Springer;Spanish Economic Association, vol. 3(1), pages 157-179, March.
    16. Anderton,Charles H. & Carter,John R., 2009. "Principles of Conflict Economics," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521875578, December.
    17. Phil Henrickson, 2020. "Predicting the costs of war," The Journal of Defense Modeling and Simulation, , vol. 17(3), pages 285-308, July.
    18. Clayton Thyne, 2017. "The impact of coups d’état on civil war duration," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 34(3), pages 287-307, May.
    19. Jose Montalvo & Marta Reynal-Querol, 2010. "Ethnic polarization and the duration of civil wars," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 11(2), pages 123-143, April.
    20. Konstantin Sonin, 2008. "A Theory of Brinkmanship, Conflicts, and Commitments," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 24(1), pages 163-183, May.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:wly:amposc:v:48:y:2004:i:4:p:813-829. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Wiley Content Delivery (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://doi.org/10.1111/(ISSN)1540-5907 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.