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Branislav L. Slantchev

Personal Details

First Name:Branislav
Middle Name:L.
Last Name:Slantchev
Suffix:
RePEc Short-ID:psl39
[This author has chosen not to make the email address public]
http://slantchev.ucsd.edu

Affiliation

University of California-San Diego (UCSD) / Department of Political Science

http://polisci.ucsd.edu
La Jolla, California (United States)

Research output

as
Jump to: Working papers Articles

Working papers

  1. Slantchev, Branislav L. & Tarar, Ahmer S., 2010. "Mutual Optimism as a Rationalist Explanation for War," MPRA Paper 40558, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised Jan 2011.
  2. Slantchev, Branislav, 2009. "Borrowed Power: Debt Finance and the Resort to Arms," MPRA Paper 40505, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 24 Jul 2012.

Articles

  1. Slantchev Branislav L., 2017. "On the Proper Use of Game-Theoretic Models in Conflict Studies," Peace Economics, Peace Science, and Public Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 23(4), pages 1-14, December.
  2. Mcmahon, R. Blake & Slantchev, Branislav L., 2015. "The Guardianship Dilemma: Regime Security through and from the Armed Forces," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 109(02), pages 297-313, May.
  3. Mcmahon, R. Blake & Slantchev, Branislav L., 2015. "The Guardianship Dilemma: Regime Security through and from the Armed Forces—ERRATUM," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 109(03), pages 636-636, August.
  4. Schneider, Christina J. & Slantchev, Branislav L., 2013. "Abiding by the Vote: Between-Groups Conflict in International Collective Action," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 67(04), pages 759-796, October.
  5. Slantchev, Branislav L., 2012. "Borrowed Power: Debt Finance and the Resort to Arms," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 106(04), pages 787-809, November.
  6. Slantchev, Branislav L., 2010. "Feigning Weakness," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 64(03), pages 357-388, July.
  7. Slantchev, Branislav L. & Alexandrova, Anna & Gartzke, Erik, 2005. "Probabilistic Causality, Selection Bias, and the Logic of the Democratic Peace," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 99(03), pages 459-462, August.
  8. Slantchev, Branislav L., 2005. "Military Coercion in Interstate Crises," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 99(04), pages 533-547, November.
  9. Slantchev, Branislav L., 2003. "The Principle of Convergence in Wartime Negotiations," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 97(04), pages 621-632, November.
  10. Slantchev, Branislav L., 2003. "The Power to Hurt: Costly Conflict with Completely Informed States," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 97(01), pages 123-133, February.

Citations

Many of the citations below have been collected in an experimental project, CitEc, where a more detailed citation analysis can be found. These are citations from works listed in RePEc that could be analyzed mechanically. So far, only a minority of all works could be analyzed. See under "Corrections" how you can help improve the citation analysis.

Working papers

  1. Slantchev, Branislav L. & Tarar, Ahmer S., 2010. "Mutual Optimism as a Rationalist Explanation for War," MPRA Paper 40558, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised Jan 2011.

    Cited by:

    1. Konrad, Kai A. & Morath, Florian, 2013. "Evolutionary determinants of war," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Economics of Change SP II 2013-302, Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB).
    2. Slantchev, Branislav, 2009. "Borrowed Power: Debt Finance and the Resort to Arms," MPRA Paper 40505, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 24 Jul 2012.
    3. Hudson Meadwell, 2016. "The rationalist puzzle of war," Quality & Quantity: International Journal of Methodology, Springer, vol. 50(4), pages 1415-1427, July.
    4. David Tingle, 2015. "Bargaining Practice and Negotiation Failure in Russia-Ukraine Gas Relations," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 1504, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.

  2. Slantchev, Branislav, 2009. "Borrowed Power: Debt Finance and the Resort to Arms," MPRA Paper 40505, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 24 Jul 2012.

    Cited by:

    1. McDougal, Topher & Caruso, Raul, 2013. "Wartime Violence and Post-Conflict Development Policy: The Case of Agricultural Concessions in Mozambique," NEPS Working Papers 1/2013, Network of European Peace Scientists.
    2. Vesperoni , Alberto, 2013. "War Finance and the Modern State," NEPS Working Papers 6/2013, Network of European Peace Scientists.

Articles

  1. Slantchev, Branislav L., 2012. "Borrowed Power: Debt Finance and the Resort to Arms," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 106(04), pages 787-809, November.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  2. Slantchev, Branislav L., 2010. "Feigning Weakness," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 64(03), pages 357-388, July.

    Cited by:

    1. Philipp Denter & Dana Sisak, 2010. ""Who's the thief?": Asymmetric Information and the Creation of Property Rights," University of St. Gallen Department of Economics working paper series 2010 2010-27, Department of Economics, University of St. Gallen.
    2. Konrad, Kai A. & Morath, Florian, 2013. "Evolutionary determinants of war," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Economics of Change SP II 2013-302, Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB).
    3. Amy Farmer & Paul Pecorino, 2013. "Discovery and Disclosure with Asymmetric Information and Endogenous Expenditure at Trial," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 42(1), pages 223-247.
    4. J. Atsu Amegashie, 2009. "Third-Party Intervention in Conflicts and the Indirect Samaritan's Dilemma," CESifo Working Paper Series 2695, CESifo Group Munich.
    5. Nakao, Keisuke, 2017. "Denial vs. Punishment: Strategies Shape War, but War Itself Affects Strategies," MPRA Paper 81418, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    6. Matthew O. Jackson & Massimo Morelli, 2011. "The Reasons for Wars: An Updated Survey," Chapters,in: The Handbook on the Political Economy of War, chapter 3 Edward Elgar Publishing.
    7. Münster, Johannes, 2008. "Repeated contests with asymmetric information
      [Wiederholte Wettkämpfe mit asymmetrischer Information]
      ," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Processes and Governance SP II 2008-08, Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB).

  3. Slantchev, Branislav L. & Alexandrova, Anna & Gartzke, Erik, 2005. "Probabilistic Causality, Selection Bias, and the Logic of the Democratic Peace," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 99(03), pages 459-462, August.

    Cited by:

    1. Bülent, Köksal & Abdülkadir, Civan, 2009. "Nükleer Enerji Sahibi Olma Kararını Etkileyen Faktörler ve Türkiye için Tahminler
      [Factors that Affect the Decision of Having Nuclear Energy and Predictions for Turkey]
      ," MPRA Paper 30513, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Sebastian Rosato, 2011. "On the Democratic Peace," Chapters,in: The Handbook on the Political Economy of War, chapter 15 Edward Elgar Publishing.

  4. Slantchev, Branislav L., 2005. "Military Coercion in Interstate Crises," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 99(04), pages 533-547, November.

    Cited by:

    1. Eric Sjöberg, 2014. "Settlement under the threat of conflict-The cost of asymmetric information," Working Paper Series, Department of Economics, University of Utah 2014_02, University of Utah, Department of Economics.
    2. Andrea Canidio & Joan-Maria Esteban, 2018. "Benevolent Mediation in the Shadow of Conflict," Working Papers 1027, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
    3. Scott Helfstein, 2012. "Liabilities of Globalization: Sovereign Debt, International Investors and Interstate Conflict with Other People's Money," International Finance, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 15(3), pages 277-288, December.

  5. Slantchev, Branislav L., 2003. "The Principle of Convergence in Wartime Negotiations," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 97(04), pages 621-632, November.

    Cited by:

    1. Clara Ponsati & Santiago Sanchez-Pages, 2012. "Optimism and commitment: an elementary theory of bargaining and war," SERIEs: Journal of the Spanish Economic Association, Springer;Spanish Economic Association, vol. 3(1), pages 157-179, March.
    2. Vincent Anesi, 2010. "Secessionism and Minority Protection in an Uncertain World," Discussion Papers 2010-15, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
    3. Sanchez-Pages, Santiago, 2009. "Bargaining and Conflict with Incomplete Information," SIRE Discussion Papers 2009-55, Scottish Institute for Research in Economics (SIRE).
    4. Jack S. Levy, 2011. "Theories and Causes of War," Chapters,in: The Handbook on the Political Economy of War, chapter 2 Edward Elgar Publishing.

  6. Slantchev, Branislav L., 2003. "The Power to Hurt: Costly Conflict with Completely Informed States," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 97(01), pages 123-133, February.

    Cited by:

    1. Konrad, Kai A. & Kovenock, Dan, 2006. "Multi-battle contests," Purdue University Economics Working Papers 1187, Purdue University, Department of Economics.
    2. Anderton,Charles H. & Carter,John R., 2009. "Principles of Conflict Economics," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521698658.
    3. Kıbrıs Arzu & Kıbrıs Özgür, 2016. "On the Dynamics of Extremist Violence," Peace Economics, Peace Science, and Public Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 22(1), pages 1-25, January.
    4. Yuri M. Zhukov, 2014. "Theory of Indiscriminate Violence," Working Paper 365551, Harvard University OpenScholar.
    5. Harold Houba & Quan Wen, 2006. "Perfect Equilibria in a Negotiation Model with Different Time Preferences," Vanderbilt University Department of Economics Working Papers 0706, Vanderbilt University Department of Economics.
    6. Harold Houba & Quan Wen, 2008. "On striking for a bargain between two completely informed agents," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 37(3), pages 509-519, December.
    7. Konrad, Kai A. & Leininger, Wolfgang, 2007. "Self-enforcing Norms and the Efficient Non-cooperative Organization of Clans," Ruhr Economic Papers 16, RWI - Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Ruhr-University Bochum, TU Dortmund University, University of Duisburg-Essen.
    8. Hudson Meadwell, 2016. "The rationalist puzzle of war," Quality & Quantity: International Journal of Methodology, Springer, vol. 50(4), pages 1415-1427, July.
    9. Houba, Harold & Wen, Quan, 2011. "Extreme equilibria in the negotiation model with different time preferences," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 73(2), pages 507-516.
    10. Nakao, Keisuke, 2017. "Denial vs. Punishment: Strategies Shape War, but War Itself Affects Strategies," MPRA Paper 81418, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    11. Robert Shum, 2014. "China, the United States, bargaining, and climate change," International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 14(1), pages 83-100, March.
    12. Meirowitz, Adam & Sartori, Anne, 2006. "Secrecy and War: The Origins of Private Information," Papers 03-31-2006, Princeton University, Research Program in Political Economy.
    13. Christopher K. Butler & Scott Gates, 2010. "The Technology of Terror: Accounting for the Strategic Use of Terrorism," Economics of Security Working Paper Series 30, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research.
    14. David Tingle, 2015. "Bargaining Practice and Negotiation Failure in Russia-Ukraine Gas Relations," Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 1504, Faculty of Economics, University of Cambridge.
    15. Jean-Pierre P. Langlois & Catherine C. Langlois, 2004. "Holding Out for Concession: The Quest for Gain in the Negotiation of International Agreements," International Interactions, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 32(3), pages 261-293, April.
    16. Yi-Chun Chen & Xiao Luo, 2008. "Delay in a bargaining game with contracts," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 65(4), pages 339-353, December.

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