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Nondisclosure as a Contract Remedy: Explaining the Advance-Notice Puzzle

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  • Addison, John T
  • Chilton, John B

Abstract

Prior theoretical work predicts an underprovision of advance-notice contracts stemming from their enforcement costs. In the present model, it is rather the fundamental inability of workers to alienate their right to quit taken in conjunction with parameters central to job separation decisions that jointly determine the mix of notice and no-notice contracts observed in equilibrium. Not all equilibrium contracts are efficient but there is no underprovision of notice. Mandating notice cannot improve on joint value and indeed may reduce it. Furthermore, although a mandate can be merely redistributive, there are cases in which it harms all parties. Copyright 1997 by University of Chicago Press.

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  • Addison, John T & Chilton, John B, 1997. "Nondisclosure as a Contract Remedy: Explaining the Advance-Notice Puzzle," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 15(1), pages 143-164, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:ucp:jlabec:v:15:y:1997:i:1:p:143-64
    DOI: 10.1086/209850
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. John T. Addison & McKinley L. Blackburn, 1994. "The Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act: Effects on Notice Provision," ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 47(4), pages 650-662, July.
    2. Edward P. Lazear, 1990. "Job Security Provisions and Employment," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 105(3), pages 699-726.
    3. John T. Addison & Pedro Portugal, 1992. "Advance Notice and Unemployment: New Evidence from the 1988 Displaced Worker Survey," ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 45(4), pages 645-664, July.
    4. John T. Addison & McKinley L. Blackburn, 1994. "The Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 8(1), pages 181-190, Winter.
    5. Kuhn, Peter, 1992. "Mandatory Notice," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 10(2), pages 117-137, April.
    6. Summers, Lawrence H, 1989. "Some Simple Economics of Mandated Benefits," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 79(2), pages 177-183, May.
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    Cited by:

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    2. Paul L. Burgess & Stuart A. Low, 1998. "How do Unemployment Insurance and Recall Expectations Affect on-the-job Search among Workers Who Receive Advance Notice of Layoff?," ILR Review, Cornell University, ILR School, vol. 51(2), pages 241-252, January.
    3. Yu-Fu Chen & Gylfi Zoega, 2012. "Slowing Down," Dundee Discussion Papers in Economics 266, Economic Studies, University of Dundee.
    4. John T. Addison & Paulino Teixeira & Jean‐Luc Grosso, 2000. "The Effect of Dismissals Protection on Employment: More on a Vexed Theme," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 67(1), pages 105-122, July.
    5. Alison L. Booth & Yu-Fu Chen & Gylfi Zoega, 2002. "Hiring and Firing: A Tale of Two Thresholds," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 20(2), pages 217-248, Part.

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