IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/taf/revpoe/v9y1997i2p117-149.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

The Emergence of Concentrated Ownership Structures in East Germany: the implications for enterprise restructuring

Author

Listed:
  • Hannah Kettler

Abstract

In the transitional economies of East and Central Europe, privatization is widely considered essential for transforming the large state-owned enterprises. However, eager to expose the public enterprises to 'hard budget constraints', economists have neglected the importance of who the owners are. Studies of ownership structures and post-privatization restructuring in east Germany provide evidence that ownership matters for transformation success. The adoption of west German institutions in the east and the sale of state industrial property in concentrated shares to 'insider' investors seem to have created good conditions for the long-term committed investments essential for the rebuilding of tangible and intangible assets in east German enterprises. However, the control structures of a sample of enterprises reveal a wide range of investment strategies between types of corporate investors. Just as legal and financial institutions set constraints on ownership structure, the ownership structure sets constraints on the range of investment choices. Whether committed investments occur will depend on constrained strategic decisions of the new private owners.

Suggested Citation

  • Hannah Kettler, 1997. "The Emergence of Concentrated Ownership Structures in East Germany: the implications for enterprise restructuring," Review of Political Economy, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 9(2), pages 117-149.
  • Handle: RePEc:taf:revpoe:v:9:y:1997:i:2:p:117-149
    DOI: 10.1080/09538259700000031
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09538259700000031
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1080/09538259700000031?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. repec:ner:ucllon:http://discovery.ucl.ac.uk/17678/ is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Aghion, Philippe & Tirole, Jean, 1997. "Formal and Real Authority in Organizations," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 105(1), pages 1-29, February.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Peter-J. Jost, 2023. "Auditing versus monitoring and the role of commitment," Review of Accounting Studies, Springer, vol. 28(2), pages 463-496, June.
    2. Daron Acemoglu & Philippe Aghion & Claire Lelarge & John Van Reenen & Fabrizio Zilibotti, 2007. "Technology, Information, and the Decentralization of the Firm," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 122(4), pages 1759-1799.
    3. Sonja Daltung & Vittoria Cerasi, 2006. "Financial structure, managerial compensation and monitoring," FMG Discussion Papers dp576, Financial Markets Group.
    4. Massimo Colombo & Annalisa Croce & Samuele Murtinu, 2014. "Ownership structure, horizontal agency costs and the performance of high-tech entrepreneurial firms," Small Business Economics, Springer, vol. 42(2), pages 265-282, February.
    5. Dirk Sliwka, 2001. "On the Costs and Benefits of Delegation in Organizations," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 157(4), pages 568-590, December.
    6. Hori, Kazumi, 2008. "The role of private benefits in information acquisition," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 68(3-4), pages 626-631, December.
    7. Nabil I. Al-Najjar & Luca Anderlini & Leonardo Felli, 2006. "Undescribable Events," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 73(4), pages 849-868.
    8. David Danz & Dorothea Kübler & Lydia Mechtenberg & Julia Schmid, 2015. "On the Failure of Hindsight-Biased Principals to Delegate Optimally," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 61(8), pages 1938-1958, August.
    9. Matthias Dahm & Nicolás Porteiro, 2008. "Informational lobbying under the shadow of political pressure," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 30(4), pages 531-559, May.
    10. Bénédicte Gendron, 2004. "Why emotional capital matters in education and in labour? toward an Optimal exploitation of human capital and knowledge management," Cahiers de la Maison des Sciences Economiques r04113, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1).
    11. Jennie Bai & Massimo Massa, 2021. "Is Human-Interaction-based Information Substitutable? Evidence from Lockdown," NBER Working Papers 29513, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    12. Christophe Loussouarn & Carine Franc & Yann Videau & Julien Mousquès, 2021. "Can General Practitioners Be More Productive? The Impact of Teamwork and Cooperation with Nurses on GP Activities," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 30(3), pages 680-698, March.
    13. Kim, Jongwook & Mahoney, Joseph T., 2008. "A Strategic Theory of the Firm as a Nexus of Incomplete Contracts: A Property Rights Approach," Working Papers 08-0108, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, College of Business.
    14. Shuo Liu & Dimitri Migrow, 2019. "Designing organizations in volatile markets," ECON - Working Papers 319, Department of Economics - University of Zurich.
    15. Illoong Kwon & Eva Meyersson Milgrom & Seiwoon Hwang, 2010. "Cohort Effects in Promotions and Wages: Evidence from Sweden and the United States," Journal of Human Resources, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 45(3).
    16. Cabrera, Elizabeth F. & Ortega, Jaime & Cabrera, Ángel, 2003. "An exploration of the factors that influence employee participation in Europe," Journal of World Business, Elsevier, vol. 38(1), pages 43-54, February.
    17. Patrick W. Schmitz, 2005. "Allocating Control in Agency Problems with Limited Liability and Sequential Hidden Actions," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 36(2), pages 318-336, Summer.
    18. Patrick W. Schmitz, 2006. "Information Gathering, Transaction Costs, and the Property Rights Approach," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(1), pages 422-434, March.
    19. Patrick Legros, 2004. "Subventions et politique de concurrence," Reflets et perspectives de la vie économique, De Boeck Université, vol. 0(1), pages 11-24.
    20. Dessein, Wouter, 2002. "Information and Control in Alliances and Ventures," CEPR Discussion Papers 3418, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:taf:revpoe:v:9:y:1997:i:2:p:117-149. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Chris Longhurst (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.tandfonline.com/CRPE20 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.