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Geometry of Cournot-Nash Equilibrium with Application to Commons and Anticommons


  • Antonio D'Agata


The author develops a simple geometric analysis of Cournot-Nash equilibrium in the price-quantity space by exploiting the economic content of the first-order condition. The approach makes it clear that strategic interdependency in oligopoly originates from externalities among producers. This explains why cartels are unstable and casts oligopoly within the more general commons-anticommons framework.

Suggested Citation

  • Antonio D'Agata, 2010. "Geometry of Cournot-Nash Equilibrium with Application to Commons and Anticommons," The Journal of Economic Education, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 41(2), pages 169-176, March.
  • Handle: RePEc:taf:jeduce:v:41:y:2010:i:2:p:169-176
    DOI: 10.1080/00220481003617277

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Jean Tirole, 1988. "The Theory of Industrial Organization," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262200716, January.
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