IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/taf/ijecbs/v22y2015i2p173-200.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Do "Reverse Payment" Settlements Constitute an Anticompetitive Pay-for-Delay?

Author

Listed:
  • Keith M. Drake
  • Martha A. Starr
  • Thomas G. McGuire

Abstract

Brand and generic drug manufacturers frequently settle patent litigation on terms that include a payment to the generic manufacturer. The Federal Trade Commission contends that these agreements extend the brand's market exclusivity and amount to anticompetitive market division. Involved parties defend the settlements as normal business agreements that reduce business risk. The anticompetitive hypothesis implies brand stock prices should rise with settlement announcements. We classify 68 brand-generic settlements into those with and without indication of a "reverse payment," and conduct an event study of the settlement announcement's influence on the brand's stock price. For settlements with indication of a reverse payment, brand stock prices rise on average 6% at the announcement. A control group of brand-generic settlements without indication of a reverse payment had no significant effect. Our results support the hypothesis that settlements with a reverse payment increase the expected profits of the brand manufacturer and are anticompetitive.

Suggested Citation

  • Keith M. Drake & Martha A. Starr & Thomas G. McGuire, 2015. "Do "Reverse Payment" Settlements Constitute an Anticompetitive Pay-for-Delay?," International Journal of the Economics of Business, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 22(2), pages 173-200, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:taf:ijecbs:v:22:y:2015:i:2:p:173-200
    DOI: 10.1080/13571516.2015.1045744
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/13571516.2015.1045744
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Ernst Berndt & Murray Aitken, 2011. "Brand Loyalty, Generic Entry and Price Competition in Pharmaceuticals in the Quarter Century after the 1984 Waxman-Hatch Legislation," International Journal of the Economics of Business, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 18(2), pages 177-201.
    2. Shapiro, Carl, 2003. "Antitrust Limits to Patent Settlements," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 34(2), pages 391-411, Summer.
    3. Ellison, Sara Fisher & Mullin, Wallace P, 2001. "Gradual Incorporation of Information: Pharmaceutical Stocks and the Evolution of President Clinton's Health Care Reform," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 44(1), pages 89-129, April.
    4. Jensen, Michael C. & Meckling, William H., 1976. "Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 305-360, October.
    5. Panattoni, Laura E., 2011. "The effect of Paragraph IV decisions and generic entry before patent expiration on brand pharmaceutical firms," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(1), pages 126-145, January.
    6. Karan Girotra & Christian Terwiesch & Karl T. Ulrich, 2007. "Valuing R& D Projects in a Portfolio: Evidence from the Pharmaceutical Industry," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 53(9), pages 1452-1466, September.
    7. Brown, Stephen J. & Warner, Jerold B., 1985. "Using daily stock returns : The case of event studies," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 3-31, March.
    8. Fama, Eugene F. & French, Kenneth R., 1993. "Common risk factors in the returns on stocks and bonds," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 33(1), pages 3-56, February.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Henry Grabowski & Carlos Brain & Anna Taub & Rahul Guha, 2017. "Pharmaceutical Patent Challenges: Company Strategies and Litigation Outcomes," American Journal of Health Economics, MIT Press, vol. 3(1), pages 33-59, Winter.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:taf:ijecbs:v:22:y:2015:i:2:p:173-200. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Chris Longhurst). General contact details of provider: http://www.tandfonline.com/CIJB20 .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.