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Do voluntary disclosures of bad news improve liquidity?

Listed author(s):
  • Dayanandan, Ajit
  • Donker, Han
  • Karahan, Gökhan
Registered author(s):

    Can managers improve market liquidity and lower the cost of capital by providing voluntary earnings guidance? This study examines the impact of profit warnings on market liquidity and finds that voluntary disclosure of bad news actually improves market liquidity. By conducting an empirical study over the period 1995–2010 on NYSE, NASDAQ and AMEX listed firms, we find that firms that issue profit warnings show enhanced market liquidity during the post-announcement period. We show that profit warnings reduce information asymmetry and lower bid-ask spreads and increase trading volumes. These results are invariant to daily (short run) and monthly (long run) data after controlling for firm specific attributes. The results have major corporate policy implications. By voluntarily disclosing negative earnings guidance by managers, firms will experience significant improvement in market liquidity, thereby lowering the cost of capital. Our results are even more profound for firms that release bad news with extremely negative stock market impact. In other words, voluntary disclosure of bad news is good for market liquidity.

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    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1062940817300025
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    Article provided by Elsevier in its journal The North American Journal of Economics and Finance.

    Volume (Year): 40 (2017)
    Issue (Month): C ()
    Pages: 16-29

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    Handle: RePEc:eee:ecofin:v:40:y:2017:i:c:p:16-29
    DOI: 10.1016/j.najef.2017.01.002
    Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/620163

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