Loan Loss Provisions, Earnings, Capital Management and Signalling: Evidence from Indian Banks
The debate on bank capital regulation has in recent years devoted specific attention to the role that bank loan loss provisions play as a part of the overall minimum capital regulatory framework. The paper examines this issue in the Indian context, exploring the available evidence about bank loan loss provisioning in the Indian context. Using data on Indian banks for 1997-2005, evidence is found in favour of both earnings and capital management by Indian banks.
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Volume (Year): 36 (2007)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
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