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An empirical study on the performance of Supreme Audit Institutions in European Union privatizations


  • L. Torres
  • V. Pina


The large number of privatizations carried out, in recent years, in the European Union and the lack of generally accepted auditing standards and methodology to guide the activity of Supreme Audit Institutions (SAIs) in these processes, show the need to analyse the activity of the SAIs in the EU countries, in order to verify its coherence with the characteristics of privatization processes and whether the interests of citizens are being protected. This paper shows the results of an empirical study on the audit of privatization processes carried out by the Supreme Audit Institutions of the European Union countries. The analysis of their activities has shown certain deficiencies that reflect the difficulties in adapting their responsibilities in the new configuration of the public sector in the twenty-first century.

Suggested Citation

  • L. Torres & V. Pina, 1999. "An empirical study on the performance of Supreme Audit Institutions in European Union privatizations," European Accounting Review, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 8(4), pages 777-795.
  • Handle: RePEc:taf:euract:v:8:y:1999:i:4:p:777-795 DOI: 10.1080/096381899335808

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    References listed on IDEAS

    1. Becker, Gary S., 1985. "Public policies, pressure groups, and dead weight costs," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 28(3), pages 329-347, December.
    2. Richard A. Posner, 1974. "Theories of Economic Regulation," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 5(2), pages 335-358, Autumn.
    3. Richard A. Posner, 1974. "Social Costs of Monopoly and Regulation," NBER Working Papers 0055, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    4. Gary S. Becker, 1983. "A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 98(3), pages 371-400.
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