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An empirical study on the performance of Supreme Audit Institutions in European Union privatizations

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  • L. Torres
  • V. Pina

Abstract

The large number of privatizations carried out, in recent years, in the European Union and the lack of generally accepted auditing standards and methodology to guide the activity of Supreme Audit Institutions (SAIs) in these processes, show the need to analyse the activity of the SAIs in the EU countries, in order to verify its coherence with the characteristics of privatization processes and whether the interests of citizens are being protected. This paper shows the results of an empirical study on the audit of privatization processes carried out by the Supreme Audit Institutions of the European Union countries. The analysis of their activities has shown certain deficiencies that reflect the difficulties in adapting their responsibilities in the new configuration of the public sector in the twenty-first century.

Suggested Citation

  • L. Torres & V. Pina, 1999. "An empirical study on the performance of Supreme Audit Institutions in European Union privatizations," European Accounting Review, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 8(4), pages 777-795.
    • Handle: RePEc:taf:euract:v:8:y:1999:i:4:p:777-795
    DOI: 10.1080/096381899335808
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    Cited by:

    1. Patricia Bachiller & Giuseppe Grossi, 2012. "Great expectations but poor results: financial and social performance of the T oscana Energia merger," Public Money & Management, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 32(1), pages 69-74, January.
    2. Lourdes Torres & Vicente Pina, 2001. "Public-private partnership and private finance initiatives in the EU and Spanish local governments," European Accounting Review, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 10(3), pages 601-619.

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