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The 'Home Grown' Presidency: empirical evidence on localism in presidential voting, 1972-2000

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  • Franklin Mixon
  • J. Matthew Tyrone

Abstract

This builds upon the conceptual framework of Lewis-Beck and Rice (American Journal of Political Science, 27, 548-56, 1983), in combination with the empirical design of Kjar and Laband (Public Choice, 112, 143-50, 2002), to investigate home grown-ness in US presidential elections from 1972-2000. It found that, ceteris paribus, home state vote shares for US Presidential election winners are 5.19-15.11 percentage points higher due to the home grown-ness effect. In the eight presidential elections analysed, this study confirms two aspects of prior work. First, the estimate of a home grown-ness effect in presidential elections of 5.19 percentage points (on average), supports the 4 percentage point average found by Lewis-Beck and Rice (1983). Second, that support for the winning president monotonically increases as moves are made away from the opponent's home territory confirms the cascading dummy variable series approach developed by Kjar and Laband (2002).

Suggested Citation

  • Franklin Mixon & J. Matthew Tyrone, 2004. "The 'Home Grown' Presidency: empirical evidence on localism in presidential voting, 1972-2000," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 36(16), pages 1745-1749.
    • Handle: RePEc:taf:applec:v:36:y:2004:i:16:p:1745-1749
    DOI: 10.1080/0003684042000227886
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    1. Nicole V. Crain & W. Mark Crain, 2013. "Legislatures," Chapters, in: William F. Shughart II & Laura Razzolini & Michael Reksulak (ed.), The Elgar Companion to Public Choice, Second Edition, chapter 9, pages 143-152, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    2. Klein, Benjamin & Leffler, Keith B, 1981. "The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual Performance," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 89(4), pages 615-641, August.
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    1. Benny Geys & Jan Vermeir, 2014. "Party Cues In Elections Under Multilevel Governance: Theory And Evidence From Us States," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 12(4), pages 1029-1058, August.
    2. Christopher M. Duquette & Franklin G . Mixon & Richard J. Cebula, 2017. "Swing States, the Winner-Take-all Electoral College, and Fiscal Federalism," Atlantic Economic Journal, Springer;International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 45(1), pages 45-57, March.
    3. Stephens-Davidowitz, Seth, 2014. "The cost of racial animus on a black candidate: Evidence using Google search data," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 118(C), pages 26-40.
    4. Cebula, Richard J., 2019. "The Voter Turnout/Relative Unemployment Rate Hypothesis," Economia Internazionale / International Economics, Camera di Commercio Industria Artigianato Agricoltura di Genova, vol. 72(3), pages 255-280.

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