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Research on Dynamic Selection of Corporate Carbon Information Disclosure Strategies Based on Reputation Theory

Author

Listed:
  • Meixia Wu
  • Shihong Zeng
  • Yuxiao Gu
  • Zhen Zhong

Abstract

With the continuous increase in global attention to climate change issues, corporate carbon information disclosure has become a key area of focus for both the academic and practical communities. This study uses the theories of information asymmetry, reputation, and the KMRW reputation model to explore the decision-making logic of Chinese enterprises' carbon information disclosure behavior. The research shows: (1) in a single-stage game, enterprises exhibit different behavioral preferences based on rational considerations. (2) In a multi-stage repeated game, they will carefully balance short-term interests and long-term reputation impacts. (3) Meanwhile, factors such as carbon prices, excess returns, and regulatory penalties will all influence the strategy choices of non-moral enterprises. The model's conclusions strongly reveal that enterprises should deeply recognize the significance of reputation for long-term sustainable development and rationally choose to truthfully disclose carbon information to achieve utility maximization. Promoting enterprises to actively fulfill their carbon information disclosure responsibilities, improving the quality of carbon information disclosure, and thereby promoting sustainable economic and social development will provide strong support for achieving the goals of "carbon peak and carbon neutrality". JEL classification numbers: O30, O31, O32, O33.

Suggested Citation

  • Meixia Wu & Shihong Zeng & Yuxiao Gu & Zhen Zhong, 2026. "Research on Dynamic Selection of Corporate Carbon Information Disclosure Strategies Based on Reputation Theory," Advances in Management and Applied Economics, SCIENPRESS Ltd, vol. 16(1), pages 1-4.
  • Handle: RePEc:spt:admaec:v:16:y:2026:i:1:f:16_1_4
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • O30 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - General
    • O31 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Innovation and Invention: Processes and Incentives
    • O32 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Management of Technological Innovation and R&D
    • O33 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Technological Change: Choices and Consequences; Diffusion Processes

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