IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/spt/admaec/v11y2021i5f11_5_3.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Real earnings management and borrowing costs: The moderating effect of the directors’ and officers' liability insurance

Author

Listed:
  • Jui-I Chang
  • Chen-Ying Lee
  • Geng-Yu Lin

Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the effects of real earnings management on firm borrowing cost of public-listed in Taiwanese manufacturing industry during 2010 to 2017, and also examines the moderating effect of the directors’ and officers’ liability insurance (D&O insurance) on real earnings management and borrowing costs. The empirical results show that borrowing cost is positively related to real earning management but negatively related to D&O insurance purchase. Therefore, the firms with D&O insurance than those without have lower borrowing costs, but the higher the D&O insurance amount, the higher the borrowing costs. Furthermore, D&O insurance has a moderating effect between the real earnings management and borrowing costs. Our findings suggest the relationship between D&O insurance and real earning management, which through the D&O insurance purchasing decision to impact on corporate borrowing costs.  JEL classification numbers: G22, G32, M41.Keywords: Real earnings management, Directors’ and officers' liability insurance,Borrowing costs, Moderating effect.

Suggested Citation

  • Jui-I Chang & Chen-Ying Lee & Geng-Yu Lin, 2021. "Real earnings management and borrowing costs: The moderating effect of the directors’ and officers' liability insurance," Advances in Management and Applied Economics, SCIENPRESS Ltd, vol. 11(5), pages 1-3.
    • Handle: RePEc:spt:admaec:v:11:y:2021:i:5:f:11_5_3
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.scienpress.com/Upload/AMAE%2fVol%2011_5_3.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Yixin Liu & Yixi Ning & Wallace N. Davidson III, 2010. "Earnings Management Surrounding New Debt Issues," The Financial Review, Eastern Finance Association, vol. 45(3), pages 659-681, August.
    2. K.V. Peasnell & P.F. Pope & S. Young, 2005. "Board Monitoring and Earnings Management: Do Outside Directors Influence Abnormal Accruals?," Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 32(7‐8), pages 1311-1346, September.
    3. Chung, Hyeesoo H. & Wynn, Jinyoung P., 2008. "Managerial legal liability coverage and earnings conservatism," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 135-153, September.
    4. Li, Kuei-Fu & Liao, Yi-Ping, 2014. "Directors' and officers' liability insurance and investment efficiency: Evidence from Taiwan," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 29(C), pages 18-34.
    5. Tsao, Shou-Min & Lin, Che-Hung & Chen, Vincent Y.S., 2015. "Family ownership as a moderator between R&D investments and CEO compensation," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 68(3), pages 599-606.
    6. Cheol Park, 2000. "Monitoring and Structure of Debt Contracts," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 55(5), pages 2157-2195, October.
    7. Shailer, Greg & Wang, Kun, 2015. "Government ownership and the cost of debt for Chinese listed corporations," Emerging Markets Review, Elsevier, vol. 22(C), pages 1-17.
    8. Holderness, Clifford G., 1990. "Liability insurers as corporate monitors," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 10(2), pages 115-129, September.
    9. Ge, Wenxia & Kim, Jeong-Bon, 2014. "Real earnings management and the cost of new corporate bonds," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 67(4), pages 641-647.
    10. Roychowdhury, Sugata, 2006. "Earnings management through real activities manipulation," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 42(3), pages 335-370, December.
    11. Lim, Steve C. & Mann, Steven C. & Mihov, Vassil T., 2017. "Do operating leases expand credit capacity? Evidence from borrowing costs and credit ratings," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 42(C), pages 100-114.
    12. Ning Jia & Xuesong Tang, 2018. "Directors’ and Officers’ Liability Insurance, Independent Director Behavior, and Governance Effect," Journal of Risk & Insurance, The American Risk and Insurance Association, vol. 85(4), pages 1013-1054, December.
    13. Cornett, Marcia Millon & Marcus, Alan J. & Tehranian, Hassan, 2008. "Corporate governance and pay-for-performance: The impact of earnings management," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(2), pages 357-373, February.
    14. K.V. Peasnell & P.F. Pope & S. Young, 2005. "Board Monitoring and Earnings Management: Do Outside Directors Influence Abnormal Accruals?," Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 32(7-8), pages 1311-1346.
    15. Xiaoying Deng & Seow Eng Ong, 2018. "Real Earnings Management, Liquidity Risk and REITs SEO Dynamics," The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 56(3), pages 410-442, April.
    16. Coles, Jeffrey L. & Daniel, Naveen D. & Naveen, Lalitha, 2008. "Boards: Does one size fit all," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(2), pages 329-356, February.
    17. Gutierrez, Maria, 2003. "An Economic Analysis of Corporate Directors' Fiduciary Duties," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 34(3), pages 516-535, Autumn.
    18. Heckman, James, 2013. "Sample selection bias as a specification error," Applied Econometrics, Russian Presidential Academy of National Economy and Public Administration (RANEPA), vol. 31(3), pages 129-137.
    19. Katherine A. Gunny, 2010. "The Relation Between Earnings Management Using Real Activities Manipulation and Future Performance: Evidence from Meeting Earnings Benchmarks," Contemporary Accounting Research, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 27(3), pages 855-888, September.
    20. Michael J. Ahearne & Jeffrey P. Boichuk & Craig J. Chapman & Thomas J. Steenburgh, 2016. "Real Earnings Management in Sales," Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 54(5), pages 1233-1266, December.
    21. Lin, Chen & Officer, Micah S. & Wang, Rui & Zou, Hong, 2013. "Directors' and officers' liability insurance and loan spreads," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 110(1), pages 37-60.
    22. Houston, Joel & James, Christopher, 1996. "Bank Information Monopolies and the Mix of Private and Public Debt Claims," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 51(5), pages 1863-1889, December.
    23. Che-Chia Chang & Chia-Wei Chen, 2018. "Directors’ and officers’ liability insurance and the trade-off between real and accrual-based earnings management," Asia-Pacific Journal of Accounting & Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 25(1-2), pages 199-217, January.
    24. Yuan, Rongli & Sun, Jian & Cao, Feng, 2016. "Directors' and officers' liability insurance and stock price crash risk," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 37(C), pages 173-192.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Meng-Chi Chueh & Shen-Ho Chang, 2022. "Effects of Directors and Officers Insurance on Earnings Management Strategies: Moderating Role of Restatement Announcements," International Journal of Business and Economic Sciences Applied Research (IJBESAR), International Hellenic University (IHU), Kavala Campus, Greece (formerly Eastern Macedonia and Thrace Institute of Technology - EMaTTech), vol. 15(1), pages 71-93, July.
    2. Liao, Tsai-Ling & Chuang, Hwei-Lin & Wang, Jo-Yu, 2022. "Directors' and officers’ liability insurance and the pricing of seasoned equity offerings," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 80(C), pages 12-26.
    3. Li, Tianshi & Yang, Tina & Zhu, Jigao, 2022. "Directors’ and officers’ liability insurance: Evidence from independent directors’ voting," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 138(C).
    4. Meng, Qingbin & Zhong, Ziya & Li, Xinyu & Wang, Song, 2023. "What protects me also makes me behave: The role of directors' and officers' liability insurance on empire-building managers in China," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 80(C).
    5. Shi, Chunling & Sun, Yaodong & Lyu, Jia, 2023. "D&O insurance, technology independent directors, and R&D investment," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 89(C).
    6. Sophie Wang, Qing & Lai, Shaojie & Pi, Shuwen & Anderson, Hamish, 2022. "Does directors' and officers' liability insurance induce empire building? Evidence from corporate labor investment," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 73(C).
    7. Lin, Feng-Yi & Guan, Liming & Ho, Chia-Ling & Wang, Teng-Shih, 2022. "Examining the D&O insurance effect on managerial ability," Finance Research Letters, Elsevier, vol. 46(PA).
    8. Meng, Qingbin & Wang, Song & Zhong, Ziya, 2024. "The effect of directors' and officers' liabilities insurance on corporate social responsibility evidence from China," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 93(C).
    9. Boahen, Eric & Mamatzakis, Emmanuel, 2016. "Do Religion, Corporate Governance and BIG 4 Audit Interactions Affect Misclassification?," MPRA Paper 76804, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    10. Jin, Hong-min & Su, Zhong-qin & Wang, Lu & Xiao, Zuoping, 2022. "Do academic independent directors matter? Evidence from stock price crash risk," Journal of Business Research, Elsevier, vol. 144(C), pages 1129-1148.
    11. Songlian Tang & Lingfei He & Fei Su & Xiaoyun Zhou, 2024. "Does directors' and officers' liability insurance improve corporate ESG performance? Evidence from China," International Journal of Finance & Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 29(3), pages 3713-3737, July.
    12. Al-Shattarat, Basiem & Hussainey, Khaled & Al-Shattarat, Wasim, 2022. "The impact of abnormal real earnings management to meet earnings benchmarks on future operating performance," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 81(C).
    13. Zhang, Xuejiao & Huang, Shoufeng & Li, Wanfu & Wang, Yu, 2023. "Directors' and officers' liability insurance, environmental regulation and firms' envi ronmental responsibility," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 208(C).
    14. Nguyen Thi Hoa Hong & Nguyen Thai Anh & Nguyen Tran Viet Hoang & Do Nhat Minh, 2023. "Corporate governance, external financing, and earnings management: new evidence from an emerging market," Future Business Journal, Springer, vol. 9(1), pages 1-22, December.
    15. Su, Xuan-Qi, 2023. "Directors' and Officers' liability insurance and cross section of expected stock returns: A mispricing explanation," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 77(C).
    16. Tunyi, Abongeh A. & Ntim, Collins G. & Danbolt, Jo, 2019. "Decoupling management inefficiency: Myopia, hyperopia and takeover likelihood," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 62(C), pages 1-20.
    17. Ramesh Chandra Das & Chandra Sekhar Mishra & Prabina Rajib, 2018. "Firm-specific Parameters and Earnings Management: A Study in the Indian Context," Global Business Review, International Management Institute, vol. 19(5), pages 1240-1260, October.
    18. Stockmans, Annelies & Lybaert, Nadine & Voordeckers, Wim, 2013. "The conditional nature of board characteristics in constraining earnings management in private family firms," Journal of Family Business Strategy, Elsevier, vol. 4(2), pages 84-92.
    19. Mujeeb Saif Mohsen Al-Absy & Ku Nor Izah Ku Ismail & Sitraselvi Chandren, 2018. "Accounting expertise in the audit committee and earnings management," Business and Economic Horizons (BEH), Prague Development Center, vol. 14(3), pages 451-476, June.
    20. Zhu, Tingting & Lu, Meiting & Shan, Yaowen & Zhang, Yuanlong, 2015. "Accrual-based and real activity earnings management at the back door: Evidence from Chinese reverse mergers," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 35(PA), pages 317-339.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    real earnings management; directors’ and officers' liability insurance; borrowing costs; moderating effect.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G22 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Insurance; Insurance Companies; Actuarial Studies
    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
    • M41 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Accounting - - - Accounting

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:spt:admaec:v:11:y:2021:i:5:f:11_5_3. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Eleftherios Spyromitros-Xioufis (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.scienpress.com/ .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.