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Directors' and officers' liability insurance and investment efficiency: Evidence from Taiwan

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  • Li, Kuei-Fu
  • Liao, Yi-Ping

Abstract

Prior studies suggest that directors' and officers' (D&O) insurance induces moral hazard and reduces incentives on behalf of stockholders. As a result, we argue that purchasing D&O insurance exhibits lower investment efficiency. Using data from Taiwan between 2008 and 2010, which is mandatorily disclosed and thus serves as an ideal sample, we test for an adverse relation between D&O insurance and investment efficiency and explore factors that affect the magnitude of that adverse relation. The results show that the level of D&O insurance coverage is positively associated with over-investment. Further analyses suggest that the positive association is more pronounced in firms with lower levels of director ownership or institutional holdings and weakened when firms purchase from domestic rather than foreign insurers. Overall, we conclude that D&O insurance has an impact on corporate investment decisions, especially in terms of over-investment, and that better corporate governance mechanisms help mitigate the inefficiency problems caused by D&O insurance.

Suggested Citation

  • Li, Kuei-Fu & Liao, Yi-Ping, 2014. "Directors' and officers' liability insurance and investment efficiency: Evidence from Taiwan," Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, Elsevier, vol. 29(C), pages 18-34.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:pacfin:v:29:y:2014:i:c:p:18-34
    DOI: 10.1016/j.pacfin.2014.03.001
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    Cited by:

    1. Yuan, Rongli & Sun, Jian & Cao, Feng, 2016. "Directors' and officers' liability insurance and stock price crash risk," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 37(C), pages 173-192.
    2. Mani Motameni, 2015. "Private Insurance and Income Inequality in Iran," Asian Economic and Financial Review, Asian Economic and Social Society, vol. 5(3), pages 418-425, March.
    3. Faisal Shahzad & Ijaz Ur Rehman & Faisal Nawaz & Noman Nawab, 2018. "Does family control explain why corporate social responsibility affects investment efficiency?," Corporate Social Responsibility and Environmental Management, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 25(5), pages 880-888, September.
    4. Chia-Chung Chan & Yung-Ho Chang & Chia-wei Chen & Yuwei Wang, 2019. "Directors’ liability insurance and investment-cash flow sensitivity," Journal of Economics and Finance, Springer;Academy of Economics and Finance, vol. 43(1), pages 27-43, January.
    5. Luo, Yan & Krivogorsky, Victoria, 2017. "The materiality of directors' and officers' insurance information: Case for disclosure," Research in Accounting Regulation, Elsevier, vol. 29(1), pages 69-74.
    6. Chen, Li-Yueh & Chen, Yu-Fen & Yang, Sheng-Yung, 2017. "Managerial incentives and R&D investments: The moderating effect of the directors’ and officers’ liability insurance," The North American Journal of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 39(C), pages 210-222.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Directors' and officers' (D&O) insurance; Corporate governance; Insurance companies; Investment efficiency; Managerial opportunism;

    JEL classification:

    • G22 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Insurance; Insurance Companies; Actuarial Studies
    • G31 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Capital Budgeting; Fixed Investment and Inventory Studies
    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill

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