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Imperfect adaptation: how the WTO and the IMF adjust to shifting power distributions among their members

Author

Listed:
  • Bernhard Zangl

    (Ludwig-Maximilian-University Munich)

  • Frederick Heußner

    (Ludwig-Maximilian-University Munich)

  • Andreas Kruck

    (Ludwig-Maximilian-University Munich)

  • Xenia Lanzendörfer

    (Ludwig-Maximilian-University Munich)

Abstract

How do international institutions adjust to shifting power distributions among their members? We argue that institutional adaptations to the rise of emerging and the decline of established powers are different from what power transition theories (PTTs) would lead us to believe. Institutional adaptations are not impossible, as pessimist PTT variants hold; and they are rarely easy to attain, let alone perfect, as optimist PTT variants imply. To bridge the gap between these versions of PTT, we propose an institutionalist power shift theory (IPST) which combines insights on the conditions and mechanisms of institutional change from functionalist, historical and distributive variants of rational institutionalism. IPST claims that institutional adaptations will succeed or fail depending on whether or not emerging powers are able to undermine the international institution and to make credible threats to this effect. To demonstrate IPST’s plausibility we analyze: (1) how India and Brazil gained the agreement of established powers to their membership in the WTO core negotiation group (“Quad”), which had previously been dominated by developed countries; and (2) how China reached agreement with established powers on (more) even-handed surveillance of IMF members’ financial stability, which, up to then, had focused on developing countries and exchange rate issues.

Suggested Citation

  • Bernhard Zangl & Frederick Heußner & Andreas Kruck & Xenia Lanzendörfer, 2016. "Imperfect adaptation: how the WTO and the IMF adjust to shifting power distributions among their members," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 11(2), pages 171-196, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:revint:v:11:y:2016:i:2:d:10.1007_s11558-016-9246-z
    DOI: 10.1007/s11558-016-9246-z
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    5. Parizek, Michal & Stephen, Matthew D., 2021. "The long march through the institutions: Emerging powers and the staffing of international organizations," EconStor Open Access Articles and Book Chapters, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, vol. 56(2), pages 204-223.
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    9. John W. McArthur & Eric Werker, 2016. "Developing countries and international organizations: Introduction to the special issue," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 11(2), pages 155-169, June.
    10. Stephen, Matthew D. & Parízek, Michal, 2019. "New Powers and the Distribution of Preferences in Global Trade Governance: From Deadlock and Drift to Fragmentation," EconStor Open Access Articles and Book Chapters, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, vol. 24(6), pages 735-758.
    11. Stephen, Matthew D., 2020. "China's new multilateral institutions: A framework and research agenda," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Global Governance SP IV 2020-102, WZB Berlin Social Science Center.
    12. Zürn, Michael, 2021. "Öffentlichkeit und Global Governance [The Public Sphere in Global Governance]," EconStor Open Access Articles and Book Chapters, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, issue Sonderban, pages 160-187.
    13. Andreas Kruck & Bernhard Zangl, 2020. "The Adjustment of International Institutions to Global Power Shifts: A Framework for Analysis," Global Policy, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 11(S3), pages 5-16, October.
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    23. Susanne Lütz, 2021. "Global–Regional Realignments in Trade, Finance and Development: Introduction to the Special Issue," Global Policy, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 12(S4), pages 5-13, May.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Institutional change; Power transition; Rational institutionalism; World Trade Organization (WTO); International Monetary Fund (IMF);
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • F5 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy
    • F53 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy - - - International Agreements and Observance; International Organizations
    • F55 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy - - - International Institutional Arrangements

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