Fear of losing in a clock auction
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- repec:kap:expeco:v:20:y:2017:i:4:d:10.1007_s10683-017-9520-9 is not listed on IDEAS
- Nicola Lacetera & Bradley J. Larsen & Devin G. Pope & Justin R. Sydnor, 2016.
"Bid Takers or Market Makers? The Effect of Auctioneers on Auction Outcome,"
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics,
American Economic Association, vol. 8(4), pages 195-229, November.
- Nicola Lacetera & Bradley J. Larsen & Devin G. Pope & Justin R. Sydnor, 2013. "Bid Takers or Market Makers? The Effect of Auctioneers on Auction Outcomes," NBER Working Papers 19731, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
More about this item
KeywordsClock auction; Regret; Lowest accepted bid; Provisional winner; D44; C78; L96;
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
- C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
- L96 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Telecommunications
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