An expected-utility model of electoral competition
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DOI: 10.1007/BF00227590
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- Norman Schofield & Robert P. Parks, 1993. "EXISTENCE OF NASH EQUILIBRIUM IN A SPATIAL MODEL OF n-PARTY COMPETITION," Public Economics 9308002, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 14 Dec 1994.
- Schofield, Norman & Parks, Robert, 2000. "Nash equilibrium in a spatial model of coalition bargaining," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 39(2), pages 133-174, March.
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