A decomposition algorithm for N-player games
An N-player game can be approximated by adding a coordinator who interacts bilaterally with each player. The coordinator proposes strategies to the players, and his payoff is maximized when each player's optimal reply agrees with his proposal. When the feasible set of proposals is finite, a solution of an associated linear complementarity problem yields an approximate equilibrium of the original game. Computational efficiency is improved by using the vertices of Kuhn's triangulation of the players' strategy space for the coordinator's pure strategies. Computational experience is reported.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Volume (Year): 42 (2010)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www.springer.com|
|Order Information:||Web: http://www.springer.com/economics/economic+theory/journal/199/PS2|
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Von Stengel, Bernhard, 2002. "Computing equilibria for two-person games," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications,in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 45, pages 1723-1759 Elsevier.
- Govindan, Srihari & Wilson, Robert, 2004. "Computing Nash equilibria by iterated polymatrix approximation," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 28(7), pages 1229-1241, April.
- Rahul Savani & Bernhard Stengel, 2006. "Hard-to-Solve Bimatrix Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 74(2), pages 397-429, 03.
- B. Curtis Eaves, 1971. "The Linear Complementarity Problem," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 17(9), pages 612-634, May.
- Govindan, Srihari & Wilson, Robert, 2003. "A global Newton method to compute Nash equilibria," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 110(1), pages 65-86, May.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:spr:joecth:v:42:y:2010:i:1:p:97-117. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Sonal Shukla)or (Rebekah McClure)
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.