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The asymptotic shapley value for a simple market game

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  • Thomas Liggett

  • Steven Lippman

  • Richard Rumelt

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  • Thomas Liggett & Steven Lippman & Richard Rumelt, 2009. "The asymptotic shapley value for a simple market game," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 40(2), pages 333-338, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:joecth:v:40:y:2009:i:2:p:333-338
    DOI: 10.1007/s00199-008-0374-4
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Robert J. Aumann, 2025. "Values of Markets with a Continuum of Traders," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: SELECTED CONTRIBUTIONS TO GAME THEORY, chapter 5, pages 115-168, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    2. Hart, Sergiu & Mas-Colell, Andreu, 1996. "Bargaining and Value," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 64(2), pages 357-380, March.
    3. Shapley, Lloyd S & Shubik, Martin, 1969. "Pure Competition, Coalitional Power, and Fair Division," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 10(3), pages 337-362, October.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Zhongwen Xu & Zixuan Peng & Ling Yang & Xudong Chen, 2018. "An Improved Shapley Value Method for a Green Supply Chain Income Distribution Mechanism," IJERPH, MDPI, vol. 15(9), pages 1-18, September.
    2. van den Brink, René & Pintér, Miklós, 2015. "On axiomatizations of the Shapley value for assignment games," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(C), pages 110-114.
    3. Luo, Chenghong & Pérez-Castrillo, David & Sun, Chaoran, 2024. "The equilibrium-value convergence for the multiple-partners game," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 220(C).
    4. Ulrich Faigle & Michel Grabisch, 2012. "Values for Markovian coalition processes," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 51(3), pages 505-538, November.
    5. repec:hal:pseose:halshs-00749950 is not listed on IDEAS
    6. Shenbo Yang & Zhongfu Tan & Liwei Ju & Hongyu Lin & Gejirifu De & Qingkun Tan & Feng’ao Zhou, 2018. "An Income Distributing Optimization Model for Cooperative Operation among Different Types of Power Sellers Considering Different Scenarios," Energies, MDPI, vol. 11(11), pages 1-24, October.
    7. Yang, Zhihua & Zhang, Qianwei, 2015. "Resource allocation based on DEA and modified Shapley value," Applied Mathematics and Computation, Elsevier, vol. 263(C), pages 280-286.
    8. René Brink & P. Herings & Gerard Laan & A. Talman, 2015. "The Average Tree permission value for games with a permission tree," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 58(1), pages 99-123, January.
    9. René Brink & Chris Dietz & Gerard Laan & Genjiu Xu, 2017. "Comparable characterizations of four solutions for permission tree games," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 63(4), pages 903-923, April.

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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
    • D41 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Perfect Competition

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