IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Log in (now much improved!) to save this article

The influence of industry concentration on merger motives—empirical evidence from machinery industry mergers

  • Florian Geiger

    ()

  • Dirk Schiereck

    ()

Registered author(s):

    By linking industrial organization theory and capital market research, we provide empirical evidence that merger motives of firms are influenced by underlying industry concentration. Analyzing wealth effects on target, acquirer and rival firms in the machinery industry, we observe significant different capital market reactions among merger announcements in dependence of underlying industry concentration. suggesting that different takeover motives prevail in fragmented and concentrated industries. In contrast to previous studies, we find besides efficiency motives evidence for monopolistic collusion motives in fragmented industries. Mergers in concentrated industries are primarily motivated to achieve productive efficiency gains. The absence of collusion motives may be an indication for a successful enforcement of antitrust legislation. Our results suggest that the magnitude of the influence of industry concentration in empirical merger motive research may have been previously under-estimated leading to a potential distortion of results. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2014

    If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s12197-011-9202-y
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

    Article provided by Springer & Academy of Economics and Finance in its journal Journal of Economics and Finance.

    Volume (Year): 38 (2014)
    Issue (Month): 1 (January)
    Pages: 27-52

    as
    in new window

    Handle: RePEc:spr:jecfin:v:38:y:2014:i:1:p:27-52
    DOI: 10.1007/s12197-011-9202-y
    Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.springer.com

    Web page: http://economics-finance.org/

    More information through EDIRC

    Order Information: Web: http://www.springer.com/economics/journal/12197/PS2

    References listed on IDEAS
    Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

    as in new window
    1. Brown, Stephen J. & Warner, Jerold B., 1985. "Using daily stock returns : The case of event studies," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 14(1), pages 3-31, March.
    2. Jean Helwege & Christo Pirinsky & René M. Stulz, 2005. "Why Do Firms Become Widely Held? An Analysis of the ynamics of Corporate Ownership," NBER Working Papers 11505, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. White, Halbert, 1980. "A Heteroskedasticity-Consistent Covariance Matrix Estimator and a Direct Test for Heteroskedasticity," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 48(4), pages 817-38, May.
    4. Andrade, Gregor & Stafford, Erik, 2004. "Investigating the economic role of mergers," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 1-36, January.
    5. Piero Morosini & Scott Shane & Harbir Singh, 1998. "National Cultural Distance and Cross-Border Acquisition Performance," Journal of International Business Studies, Palgrave Macmillan;Academy of International Business, vol. 29(1), pages 137-158, March.
    6. James L. Davis & Eugene F. Fama & Kenneth R. French, . "Characteristics, Covariances, and Average Returns: 1929 to 1997," CRSP working papers 359, Center for Research in Security Prices, Graduate School of Business, University of Chicago.
    7. Catherine J. Morrison Paul, 2003. "Cost Economies: A Driving Force for Consolidation and Concentration?," Southern Economic Journal, Southern Economic Association, vol. 70(1), pages 110-127, July.
    8. Roll, Richard, 1986. "The Hubris Hypothesis of Corporate Takeovers," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 59(2), pages 197-216, April.
    9. Harrington, Scott E. & Shrider, David G., 2007. "All Events Induce Variance: Analyzing Abnormal Returns When Effects Vary across Firms," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 42(01), pages 229-256, March.
    10. Ralph A. Walkling & Michael S. Long, 1984. "Agency Theory, Managerial Welfare, and Takeover Bid Resistance," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 15(1), pages 54-68, Spring.
    11. Eckbo, B. Espen, 1983. "Horizontal mergers, collusion, and stockholder wealth," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 11(1-4), pages 241-273, April.
    12. Shahrur, Husayn, 2005. "Industry structure and horizontal takeovers: Analysis of wealth effects on rivals, suppliers, and corporate customers," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 76(1), pages 61-98, April.
    13. Randolph B. Cohen & Christopher Polk & Tuomo Vuolteenaho, 2003. "The Value Spread," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 58(2), pages 609-642, 04.
    14. Curry, B & George, K D, 1983. "Industrial Concentration: A Survey," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 31(3), pages 203-55, March.
    15. Moeller, Sara B. & Schlingemann, Frederik P. & Stulz, Rene M., 2004. "Firm size and the gains from acquisitions," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 73(2), pages 201-228, August.
    16. Kathleen Fuller & Jeffry Netter & Mike Stegemoller, 2002. "What Do Returns to Acquiring Firms Tell Us? Evidence from Firms That Make Many Acquisitions," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 57(4), pages 1763-1793, 08.
    17. Stillman, Robert, 1983. "Examining antitrust policy towards horizontal mergers," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 11(1-4), pages 225-240, April.
    18. Slade, Margaret E., 2004. "Competing models of firm profitability," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 22(3), pages 289-308, March.
    19. Hirschey, Mark, 1985. "Market Structure and Market Value," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 58(1), pages 89-98, January.
    20. Boehmer, Ekkehart & Masumeci, Jim & Poulsen, Annette B., 1991. "Event-study methodology under conditions of event-induced variance," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(2), pages 253-272, December.
    21. Gregor Andrade & Mark Mitchell & Erik Stafford, 2001. "New Evidence and Perspectives on Mergers," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 15(2), pages 103-120, Spring.
    22. Aloke Ghosh, 2004. "Increasing Market Share as a Rationale for Corporate Acquisitions," Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 31(1-2), pages 209-247.
    23. Kewei Hou & David T. Robinson, 2006. "Industry Concentration and Average Stock Returns," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 61(4), pages 1927-1956, 08.
    24. Andres Almazan & Carlos A. Molina, 2005. "Intra-Industry Capital Structure Dispersion," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 14(2), pages 263-297, 06.
    25. Cornett, Marcia Millon & McNutt, Jamie John & Tehranian, Hassan, 2006. "Performance Changes around Bank Mergers: Revenue Enhancements versus Cost Reductions," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 38(4), pages 1013-1050, June.
    26. Eckbo, B Espen & Wier, Peggy, 1985. "Antimerger Policy under the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act: A Reexamination of the Market Power Hypothesis," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 28(1), pages 119-49, April.
    27. David J. Denis & Diane K. Denis & Keven Yost, 2002. "Global Diversification, Industrial Diversification, and Firm Value," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 57(5), pages 1951-1979, October.
    28. Berkovitch, Elazar & Narayanan, M. P., 1993. "Motives for Takeovers: An Empirical Investigation," Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 28(03), pages 347-362, September.
    29. Bradley, Michael & Desai, Anand & Kim, E. Han, 1988. "Synergistic gains from corporate acquisitions and their division between the stockholders of target and acquiring firms," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 21(1), pages 3-40, May.
    30. Fee, C. Edward & Thomas, Shawn, 2004. "Sources of gains in horizontal mergers: evidence from customer, supplier, and rival firms," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 74(3), pages 423-460, December.
    31. Jonathan B. Baker, 2003. "The Case for Antitrust Enforcement," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 17(4), pages 27-50, Fall.
    32. Seyhun, H Nejat, 1990. "Do Bidder Managers Knowingly Pay Too Much for Target Firms?," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 63(4), pages 439-64, October.
    33. Demsetz, Harold, 1973. "Industry Structure, Market Rivalry, and Public Policy," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 16(1), pages 1-9, April.
    34. M. Mark Walker, 2000. "Corporate Takeovers, Strategic Objectives and Acquring Firm Shareholder Wealth," Financial Management, Financial Management Association, vol. 29(1), Spring.
    35. Azzam, Azzeddine M, 1997. "Measuring Market Power and Cost-Efficiency Effects of Industrial Concentration," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 45(4), pages 377-86, December.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

    When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:spr:jecfin:v:38:y:2014:i:1:p:27-52. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Sonal Shukla)

    or (Rebekah McClure)

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

    If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.