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Anger in social conflict: Cross-situational comparisons and suggestions for the future

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Listed:
  • Gerben A. Kleef

    (University of Amsterdam)

  • Eric Dijk

    (Leiden University)

  • Wolfgang Steinel

    (Leiden University)

  • Fieke Harinck

    (Leiden University)

  • Ilja Beest

    (Leiden University)

Abstract

This paper reviews research on the role of anger in conflict. We distinguish between intrapersonal and interpersonal effects of anger, the former referring to the impact of parties’ feelings of anger on their own behavior and the latter referring to the impact of one parties’ anger on the other’s behavior. We further compare the effects of anger across a variety of conflict settings, including negotiation, ultimatum bargaining, prisoner’s dilemma, resource dilemma, and coalition formation. At the intrapersonal level, anger is associated with competition in all conflict settings. In contrast, the interpersonal effects of anger differ across situations, with anger sometimes eliciting cooperation, sometimes eliciting competition, and sometimes having no effect. Based on the research reviewed, we conclude that the interpersonal effects of anger in conflict are determined by the level of interdependence of the parties, their information processing tendencies, and the justifiability of the anger expressions.

Suggested Citation

  • Gerben A. Kleef & Eric Dijk & Wolfgang Steinel & Fieke Harinck & Ilja Beest, 2008. "Anger in social conflict: Cross-situational comparisons and suggestions for the future," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 17(1), pages 13-30, January.
  • Handle: RePEc:spr:grdene:v:17:y:2008:i:1:d:10.1007_s10726-007-9092-8
    DOI: 10.1007/s10726-007-9092-8
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    Cited by:

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    2. Brett, Jeanne & Thompson, Leigh, 2016. "Negotiation," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Elsevier, vol. 136(C), pages 68-79.
    3. Rothman, Naomi B., 2011. "Steering sheep: How expressed emotional ambivalence elicits dominance in interdependent decision making contexts," Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, Elsevier, vol. 116(1), pages 66-82, September.
    4. Simon Bartke & Steven J. Bosworth & Dennis J. Snower & Gabriele Chierchia, 2019. "Motives and comprehension in a public goods game with induced emotions," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 86(2), pages 205-238, March.
    5. Bartke, Simon & Bosworth, Steven J. & Snower, Dennis & Chierchia, Gabriele, 2016. "The influence of induced care and anger motives on behavior, beliefs and perceptions in a public goods game," Kiel Working Papers 2054, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel).
    6. Hans-Rüdiger Pfister & Gisela Böhm, 2012. "Responder Feelings in a Three-Player Three-Option Ultimatum Game: Affective Determinants of Rejection Behavior," Games, MDPI, vol. 3(1), pages 1-29, February.
    7. Wubben, Maarten J.J. & Cremer, David De & Dijk, Eric van, 2011. "The communication of anger and disappointment helps to establish cooperation through indirect reciprocity," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 32(3), pages 489-501, June.
    8. Patrick Ring & Christoph A. Schütt & Dennis J. Snower, 2023. "Care and anger motives in social dilemmas," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 95(2), pages 273-308, August.
    9. Kausel, Edgar E. & Connolly, Terry, 2014. "Do people have accurate beliefs about the behavioral consequences of incidental emotions? Evidence from trust games," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 42(C), pages 96-111.

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