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How signaling and search costs affect information asymmetry in P2P lending: the economics of big data

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Listed:
  • Jiaqi Yan

    (University of Zurich)

  • Wayne Yu

    (City University of Hong Kong)

  • J. Leon Zhao

    (City University of Hong Kong)

Abstract

In the past decade, online Peer-to-Peer (P2P) lending platforms have transformed the lending industry, which has been historically dominated by commercial banks. Information technology breakthroughs such as big data-based financial technologies (Fintech) have been identified as important disruptive driving forces for this paradigm shift. In this paper, we take an information economics perspective to investigate how big data affects the transformation of the lending industry. By identifying how signaling and search costs are reduced by big data analytics for credit risk management of P2P lending, we discuss how information asymmetry is reduced in the big data era. Rooted in the lending business, we propose a theory on the economics of big data and outline a number of research opportunities and challenging issues.

Suggested Citation

  • Jiaqi Yan & Wayne Yu & J. Leon Zhao, 2015. "How signaling and search costs affect information asymmetry in P2P lending: the economics of big data," Financial Innovation, Springer;Southwestern University of Finance and Economics, vol. 1(1), pages 1-11, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:fininn:v:1:y:2015:i:1:d:10.1186_s40854-015-0018-1
    DOI: 10.1186/s40854-015-0018-1
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    References listed on IDEAS

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