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Rumor Governance Under Uncertain Conditions: An Evolutionary Game Theory Analysis

Author

Listed:
  • Xuefan Dong

    (Beijing University of Technology
    Beijing University of Technology)

  • Lei Tang

    (Beijing University of Technology)

Abstract

In the rapidly evolving landscape of online information dissemination, managing rumors has become an imperative challenge for governments worldwide. This study employs a tripartite evolutionary game model to examine the behavior evolution of the government, online media, and netizens in the process of rumor propagation under uncertain conditions. The innovation of the model lies in considering the probability of successful rumor detection under government regulation, the uncertainty of rumor dissemination by online media and netizens, and introducing a dynamic government penalty mechanism. Through simulation and analysis, we identify the evolutionarily stable strategies of each participant under different scenarios and provide specific governance strategies for each party involved. The results reveal that appropriate government penalties, proactive regulation by online media, and rational choices by netizens can effectively curb rumor spreading. In uncertain environments, adopting flexible policies and dynamic adjustment mechanisms is crucial for effective rumor governance. The results reveal that appropriate government penalties, proactive regulation by online media, and rational choices by netizens can effectively curb rumor spreading. In uncertain environments, adopting flexible policies and dynamic adjustment mechanisms is crucial for effective rumor governance. This study not only enriches the application of evolutionary game theory but also offers practical strategic recommendations for policymakers to address the challenges of rumor propagation.

Suggested Citation

  • Xuefan Dong & Lei Tang, 2025. "Rumor Governance Under Uncertain Conditions: An Evolutionary Game Theory Analysis," Annals of Data Science, Springer, vol. 12(3), pages 1073-1111, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:aodasc:v:12:y:2025:i:3:d:10.1007_s40745-025-00606-y
    DOI: 10.1007/s40745-025-00606-y
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