Game models of environmental policy in an open economy
In this paper we study some aspects of the question of international environmental regulation from a game theoretic perspective. We address two broad questions. First, we examine the circumstances under which the pursuit of unilateral environmental policy by a country in a Stackelberg game, will make that country worse off. Second, we study the effects of environmental regulation by means of alternate price control instruments in a Stackelberg game when there is transboundary pollution. We find that there are plausible theoretical circumstances in which the pursuit of unilateral environmental policy is not a good idea. Further, we show that in choosing between alternate pollution control instruments, national governments typically face a tradeoff between instruments which correct more distortions but are costly to implement and instruments which correct fewer distortions but are less costly to implement. In particular, we obtain a dominance result for a tariff policy; this result favors the use of tariffs from an informational standpoint alone.
To our knowledge, this item is not available for
download. To find whether it is available, there are three
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
Volume (Year): 30 (1996)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
|Note:||Received: January 1995 / Accepted: September 1995|
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www.springer.com|
|Order Information:||Web: http://link.springer.com/journal/168|
References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Markusen James R. & Morey Edward R. & Olewiler Nancy D., 1993.
"Environmental Policy when Market Structure and Plant Locations Are Endogenous,"
Journal of Environmental Economics and Management,
Elsevier, vol. 24(1), pages 69-86, January.
- James R. Markusen & Edward R. Morey & Nancy Olewiler, 1991. "Environmental Policy When Market Structure and Plant Locations are Endo-genous," NBER Working Papers 3671, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- McGuire, Martin C., 1982. "Regulation, factor rewards, and international trade," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(3), pages 335-354, April.
- Merrifield, John D., 1988. "The impact of selected abatement strategies on transnational pollution, the terms of trade, and factor rewards: A general equilibrium approach," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 15(3), pages 259-284, September.
- Markusen, James R., 1975. "International externalities and optimal tax structures," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 5(1), pages 15-29, February.
- Pethig, Rudiger, 1976. "Pollution, welfare, and environmental policy in the theory of Comparative Advantage," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 2(3), pages 160-169, February.
- Tobey, James A, 1990. "The Effects of Domestic Environmental Policies on Patterns of World Trade: An Empirical Test," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 43(2), pages 191-209. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)