IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/spr/annopr/v295y2020i1d10.1007_s10479-020-03707-4.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Buyback contract under asymmetric information about retailer’s loss aversion nature

Author

Listed:
  • Sri Vanamalla Venkataraman

    (Indian Institute of Technology Kanpur)

  • Dereje Asfaw

    (Indian Institute of Technology Kanpur)

Abstract

We consider a two-echelon supply chain with a risk neutral manufacturer and a loss-averse retailer. The type of loss aversion of the retailer is considered to be a private information of the retailer. Loss aversion often leads to the situation of the retailer buying below the estimated sales, which deprives the manufacturer of his market share. To offset this issue, we propose a contract design which the manufacturer offers to the retailer. We show that the contract ensures the loss averse retailer, while at the same time, it increases the manufacturer’s market share, thus creating a win–win situation for both the manufacturer and the retailer.

Suggested Citation

  • Sri Vanamalla Venkataraman & Dereje Asfaw, 2020. "Buyback contract under asymmetric information about retailer’s loss aversion nature," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 295(1), pages 385-409, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:annopr:v:295:y:2020:i:1:d:10.1007_s10479-020-03707-4
    DOI: 10.1007/s10479-020-03707-4
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s10479-020-03707-4
    File Function: Abstract
    Download Restriction: Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1007/s10479-020-03707-4?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Elena Katok & Diana Yan Wu, 2009. "Contracting in Supply Chains: A Laboratory Investigation," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 55(12), pages 1953-1968, December.
    2. Charles X. Wang & Scott Webster & Sidong Zhang, 2012. "Newsvendor Models with Alternative Risk Preferences Within Expected Utility Theory and Prospect Theory Frameworks," International Series in Operations Research & Management Science, in: Tsan-Ming Choi (ed.), Handbook of Newsvendor Problems, edition 127, chapter 0, pages 177-196, Springer.
    3. Maurice E. Schweitzer & Gérard P. Cachon, 2000. "Decision Bias in the Newsvendor Problem with a Known Demand Distribution: Experimental Evidence," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 46(3), pages 404-420, March.
    4. Charles J. Corbett, 2001. "Stochastic Inventory Systems in a Supply Chain with Asymmetric Information: Cycle Stocks, Safety Stocks, and Consignment Stock," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 49(4), pages 487-500, August.
    5. Deng, Xiaoxue & Xie, Jinxing & Xiong, Huachun, 2013. "Manufacturer–retailer contracting with asymmetric information on retailer's degree of loss aversion," International Journal of Production Economics, Elsevier, vol. 142(2), pages 372-380.
    6. Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, 2013. "Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Leonard C MacLean & William T Ziemba (ed.), HANDBOOK OF THE FUNDAMENTALS OF FINANCIAL DECISION MAKING Part I, chapter 6, pages 99-127, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    7. Chen, Xu & Hao, Gang & Li, Ling, 2014. "Channel coordination with a loss-averse retailer and option contracts," International Journal of Production Economics, Elsevier, vol. 150(C), pages 52-57.
    8. C-S Shi & C-T Su, 2004. "Integrated inventory model of returns-quantity discounts contract," Journal of the Operational Research Society, Palgrave Macmillan;The OR Society, vol. 55(3), pages 240-246, March.
    9. Charles J. Corbett & Deming Zhou & Christopher S. Tang, 2004. "Designing Supply Contracts: Contract Type and Information Asymmetry," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 50(4), pages 550-559, April.
    10. Charles J. Corbett & Xavier de Groote, 2000. "A Supplier's Optimal Quantity Discount Policy Under Asymmetric Information," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 46(3), pages 444-450, March.
    11. Qinghua Li & Bo Li & Ping Chen & Pengwen Hou, 2017. "Dual-channel supply chain decisions under asymmetric information with a risk-averse retailer," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 257(1), pages 423-447, October.
    12. Macho-Stadler, Ines & Perez-Castrillo, J. David, 2001. "An Introduction to the Economics of Information: Incentives and Contracts," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, edition 2, number 9780199243259.
    13. Bin Shen & Tsan-Ming Choi & Stefan Minner, 2019. "A review on supply chain contracting with information considerations: information updating and information asymmetry," International Journal of Production Research, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 57(15-16), pages 4898-4936, August.
    14. Albert Y. Ha, 2001. "Supplier‐buyer contracting: Asymmetric cost information and cutoff level policy for buyer participation," Naval Research Logistics (NRL), John Wiley & Sons, vol. 48(1), pages 41-64, February.
    15. Wang, Charles X. & Webster, Scott, 2009. "The loss-averse newsvendor problem," Omega, Elsevier, vol. 37(1), pages 93-105, February.
    16. Kuiran Shi & Tiaojun Xiao, 2008. "Coordination of a supply chain with a loss-averse retailer under two types of contracts," International Journal of Information and Decision Sciences, Inderscience Enterprises Ltd, vol. 1(1), pages 5-25.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Tarun Jain & Jishnu Hazra & T. C. E. Cheng, 2023. "Analysis of upstream pricing regulation and contract structure in an agriculture supply chain," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 320(1), pages 85-122, January.
    2. Li, Yadong & Guan, Zhenzhong & Ren, Jianbiao, 2023. "Channel coordination under retailer's (sub)conscious preferences of loss aversion and fairness," Journal of Retailing and Consumer Services, Elsevier, vol. 74(C).

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Vipin, B. & Amit, R.K., 2017. "Loss aversion and rationality in the newsvendor problem under recourse option," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 261(2), pages 563-571.
    2. İsmail Bakal & Nesim Erkip & Refik Güllü, 2011. "Value of supplier’s capacity information in a two-echelon supply chain," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 191(1), pages 115-135, November.
    3. Amiya K. Chakravarty & Jun Zhang, 2007. "Collaboration in contingent capacities with information asymmetry," Naval Research Logistics (NRL), John Wiley & Sons, vol. 54(4), pages 421-432, June.
    4. Wei Liu & Han Zhao & Shiji Song & Wenxuan He & Xiaochen Li, 2021. "Coping with Loss Aversion and Risk Management in the Supply Chain Coordination," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 13(8), pages 1-18, April.
    5. Rahimi-Ghahroodi, S. & Al Hanbali, A. & Zijm, W.H.M. & Timmer, J.B., 2020. "Multi-resource emergency supply contracts with asymmetric information in the after-sales services," International Journal of Production Economics, Elsevier, vol. 229(C).
    6. Michael Becker-Peth & Elena Katok & Ulrich W. Thonemann, 2013. "Designing Buyback Contracts for Irrational But Predictable Newsvendors," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 59(8), pages 1800-1816, August.
    7. Abdolkarim Sadrieh & Guido Voigt, 2017. "Strategic risk in supply chain contract design," Journal of Business Economics, Springer, vol. 87(1), pages 125-153, January.
    8. Wei, Ying & Xiong, Sijia & Li, Feng, 2019. "Ordering bias with two reference profits: Exogenous benchmark and minimum requirement," Transportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review, Elsevier, vol. 128(C), pages 229-250.
    9. Dimitris Zissis & George Ioannou & Apostolos Burnetas, 2020. "Coordinating Lot Sizing Decisions Under Bilateral Information Asymmetry," Production and Operations Management, Production and Operations Management Society, vol. 29(2), pages 371-387, February.
    10. Hu, Benyong & Meng, Chao & Xu, Dong & Son, Young-Jun, 2016. "Three-echelon supply chain coordination with a loss-averse retailer and revenue sharing contracts," International Journal of Production Economics, Elsevier, vol. 179(C), pages 192-202.
    11. Yan, Nina & Xu, Xun & Huang, Wenyi, 2021. "Supplier's capacity investment strategy with factoring finance," International Journal of Production Economics, Elsevier, vol. 238(C).
    12. Dimitris Kostamis & Izak Duenyas, 2011. "Purchasing Under Asymmetric Demand and Cost Information: When Is More Private Information Better?," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 59(4), pages 914-928, August.
    13. Liu, Zhongyi & Chen, Lihua & Li, Ling & Zhai, Xin, 2014. "Risk hedging in a supply chain: Option vs. price discount," International Journal of Production Economics, Elsevier, vol. 151(C), pages 112-120.
    14. Ruozhen Qiu & Yue Yu & Minghe Sun, 2021. "Joint pricing and stocking decisions for a newsvendor problem with loss aversion and reference point effect," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 42(2), pages 275-288, March.
    15. Özalp Özer & Yanchong Zheng & Kay-Yut Chen, 2011. "Trust in Forecast Information Sharing," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 57(6), pages 1111-1137, June.
    16. Xiang Li & Yongjian Li, 2016. "On lot-sizing problem in a random yield production system under loss aversion," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 240(2), pages 415-434, May.
    17. Herweg, Fabian, 2013. "The expectation-based loss-averse newsvendor," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 120(3), pages 429-432.
    18. Becker-Peth, Michael & Thonemann, Ulrich W., 2016. "Reference points in revenue sharing contracts—How to design optimal supply chain contracts," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 249(3), pages 1033-1049.
    19. Xinsheng, Xu & Zhiqing, Meng & Rui, Shen & Min, Jiang & Ping, Ji, 2015. "Optimal decisions for the loss-averse newsvendor problem under CVaR," International Journal of Production Economics, Elsevier, vol. 164(C), pages 146-159.
    20. Xia, Jing & Niu, Wenju, 2021. "Carbon-reducing contract design for a supply chain with environmental responsibility under asymmetric information," Omega, Elsevier, vol. 102(C).

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:spr:annopr:v:295:y:2020:i:1:d:10.1007_s10479-020-03707-4. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.