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Антиконкурентные Последствия Антимонопольной Политики: Кейс Мобильных Операторов

Author

Listed:
  • Шаститко А. Е.
  • Павлова Н. С.

Abstract

Недавнее антимонопольное дело против мобильного оператора "Теле2" продемонстрировало, что решения, принимаемые органом государственного управления, могут противоречить целям, ради достижения которых орган власти наделяется полномочиями. Поставив задачу показать, каким образом это может происходить, авторы предположили, что решение регулятора о наличии антимонопольного нарушения, принятое на основе некорректной трактовки поведения компании-олигополиста, может иметь негативные последствия для конкуренции на затронутом рынке. Теоретическая часть работы базируется на концепции фирмы-"индивидуалиста" (maverick firm). Эмпирическую базу работы составили данные по рынку сотовой связи в России в период с 2017 по 2020 гг. В исследовании показано, что наблюдаемые результаты функционирования рынка сотовой связи в России не содержат признаков, указывающих на ограничение конкуренции. Приведены доказательства, что поведение "Теле2" на рынке сотовой связи соответствует критериям фирмы-"индивидуалиста", принятым в исследовательской литературе и в зарубежной правоприменительной практике. Объяснено, почему трактовка поведения фирмы-"индивидуалиста" как злоупотребления доминированием (отраженная в деле о нарушении антимонопольного законодательства) противоречит экономической сути такого поведения. Определены возможные антиконкурентные последствия такой трактовки и основанных на ней антимонопольных мер. Проведенный анализ подчеркивает роль мезоинститутов с точки зрения эффективности и результативности функционирования системы государственного управления в сфере защиты конкуренции и раскрывает источники побочных эффектов антимонопольной политики, которые в том числе могут выражаться в создании стимулов к менее активной конкуренции.

Suggested Citation

  • Шаститко А. Е. & Павлова Н. С., 2021. "Антиконкурентные Последствия Антимонопольной Политики: Кейс Мобильных Операторов," Вопросы государственного и муниципального управления // Public administration issues, НИУ ВШЭ, issue 2, pages 7-33.
    • Handle: RePEc:scn:vgmu00:2021:i:2:p:7-33
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    References listed on IDEAS

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