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Процедуры Общественного Выбора Линейной Бюджетно-Налоговой Структуры

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  • Граборов С.В.

Abstract

Выбор наилучшей бюджетно-налоговой структуры по правилу большинства обеспечивается унификацией налогообложения группы избирателей. Такая структура оптимизируется в рамках многопродуктовой экономики с налогами на имущество, доходы и потребление физических и юридических лиц. При ряде условий доказано формирование устойчивой коалиции избирателей, включающей "чистых" наемных работников и получателей трансфертов. Построена бюджетно-налоговая задача, оптимальное решение которой обеспечивает максимум разности доходов и налоговых платежей каждому участнику такого объединения.

Suggested Citation

  • Граборов С.В., 2013. "Процедуры Общественного Выбора Линейной Бюджетно-Налоговой Структуры," Журнал Экономика и математические методы (ЭММ), Центральный Экономико-Математический Институт (ЦЭМИ), vol. 49(2), pages 71-86, апрель.
    • Handle: RePEc:scn:cememm:v:49:y:2013:i:2:p:71-86
    Note: Москва
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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