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Labelling and Differentiation Strategy in the Recreational Housing Rental Market of Rural Destinations: The French Case

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  • M. Rambonilaza

    (CEMAGREF, Agriculture and Dynamics of Rural Areas Unit, 50 avenue de Verdun, F-33612 Bordeaux, France)

Abstract

In France the rural recreational housing rental market is composed of two parts: the market for ‘non-labelled’ lodgings and the market for ‘labelled’ lodgings. Two national federations with branches in each region of France manage the labelled segment. In this article the hedonic price approach is developed (a) to assess the labelling premium in the recreational housing rental market of rural destinations in France and (b) to examine the two federations' differentiation strategies. The author uses a database for the Aveyron region for the summer season of the year 2002. The data for labelled lodgings are drawn from catalogues produced by the labelling federations, and the information for non-labelled accommodation was gathered from local tourism information brochures. The study reveals that labels are indeed valued positively by the market. The labelling premium can reach ₠129 per week in the peak season. Moreover, environmental variables (such as the population density of the commune in which the lodging is located) are the key variables of differentiation in the labelled lodgings market. The results can assist federation managers in defining labelling and pricing strategies. They also point to some new directions for public initiatives to encourage the development of this type of accommodation in rural destinations.

Suggested Citation

  • M. Rambonilaza, 2006. "Labelling and Differentiation Strategy in the Recreational Housing Rental Market of Rural Destinations: The French Case," Tourism Economics, , vol. 12(3), pages 347-359, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:toueco:v:12:y:2006:i:3:p:347-359
    DOI: 10.5367/000000006778493619
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Jean Tirole, 1996. "A Theory of Collective Reputations (with applications to the persistence of corruption and to firm quality)," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 63(1), pages 1-22.
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    Cited by:

    1. Pierre-Alexandre Mahieu & Romain Craste & Bengt Kriström & Pere Riera, 2014. "Non-market valuation in France: An overview of the research activity," Working Papers hal-01087365, HAL.
    2. de Oliveira Santos, Glauber Eduardo, 2016. "Worldwide hedonic prices of subjective characteristics of hostels," Tourism Management, Elsevier, vol. 52(C), pages 451-454.
    3. Jaume Rosselló & Antoni Riera, 2012. "Pricing European Package Tours: The Impact of New Distribution Channels and Low-Cost Airlines," Tourism Economics, , vol. 18(2), pages 265-279, April.

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