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The Explanatory Power of Models and Simulations: A Philosophical Exploration

Author

Listed:
  • Paul Weirich

    (University of Missouri, USA, weirichp@missouri.edu)

Abstract

Some computer simulations have explanatory goals. In a typical case, the computer simulation exemplifies a model generating a phenomenon under investigation. For the simulation to be explanatory, the model has to be explanatory. Models that fully explain phenomena are rare, but a model may offer a partial explanation of a phenomenon. It does this if an isomorphism holds between certain features of the model and certain features of a natural system realizing the phenomenon. The first two sections elaborate this account of a simulation’s explanatory power. The third section illustrates the account by applying it to Brian Skyrms’s (2004) simulations of the evolution of cooperation. The final section uses the account to suggest ways of increasing those simulations’ explanatory power.

Suggested Citation

  • Paul Weirich, 2011. "The Explanatory Power of Models and Simulations: A Philosophical Exploration," Simulation & Gaming, , vol. 42(2), pages 155-176, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:simgam:v:42:y:2011:i:2:p:155-176
    DOI: 10.1177/1046878108319639
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    3. Michael Bacharach, 2006. "The Hi-Lo Paradox, from Beyond Individual Choice: Teams and Frames in Game Theory," Introductory Chapters, in: Natalie Gold & Robert Sugden (ed.),Beyond Individual Choice: Teams and Frames in Game Theory, Princeton University Press.
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