IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/sae/jospec/v2y2001i2p131-144.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

The New NBA Collective Bargaining Agreement, the Median Voter Model, and a Robin Hood Rent Redistribution

Author

Listed:
  • J. Richard Hill

    (Central Michigan University)

  • Peter A. Groothuis

    (Westminster College)

Abstract

In this article, it is suggested that the new collective bargaining agreement (CBA) in the National Basketball Association (NBA) redistributes rents from the superstars back to the median voters. In particular, it is suggested that portions of the new agreement, such as salary caps, are designed to improve the rather skewed distribution of salaries in the NBA. Evidence from a Lorenz curve analysis of the first 2 years under the new contract suggests that all players with salaries below the median wage gain from the new agreement, and those with salaries closest to the median wage gain the most. The analysis suggests that skewed salary distributions may lead to CBAs that redistribute the rents from the rich (superstars) to the poor (median voters).

Suggested Citation

  • J. Richard Hill & Peter A. Groothuis, 2001. "The New NBA Collective Bargaining Agreement, the Median Voter Model, and a Robin Hood Rent Redistribution," Journal of Sports Economics, , vol. 2(2), pages 131-144, May.
  • Handle: RePEc:sae:jospec:v:2:y:2001:i:2:p:131-144
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://jse.sagepub.com/content/2/2/131.abstract
    Download Restriction: no

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Dietl Helmut M & Duschl Tobias & Lang Markus, 2011. "Executive Pay Regulation: What Regulators, Shareholders, and Managers Can Learn from Major Sports Leagues," Business and Politics, De Gruyter, vol. 13(2), pages 1-32, August.
    2. Pelnar, Gregory, 2007. "Antitrust Analysis of Sports Leagues," MPRA Paper 5382, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    3. Helmut Dietl & Tobias Duschl & Markus Lang, 2010. "Gehaltsobergrenzen und Luxussteuern: Erkenntnisse aus dem professionellen Mannschaftssport," Working Papers 0039, University of Zurich, Center for Research in Sports Administration (CRSA).
    4. Erick Eschker & Stephen Perez & Mark Siegler, 2004. "The NBA and the influx of international basketball players," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 36(10), pages 1009-1020.
    5. Richard C. K. Burdekin & Richard T. Hossfeld & Janet Kiholm Smith, 2005. "Are NBA Fans Becoming Indifferent to Race? Evidence From the 1990s," Journal of Sports Economics, , vol. 6(2), pages 144-159, May.
    6. R Simmons & D J Berri, 2010. "Mixing the princes and the paupers: Pay and performance in the National Basketball Association," Working Papers 611523, Lancaster University Management School, Economics Department.
    7. repec:lan:wpaper:3659 is not listed on IDEAS
    8. Simmons, Rob & Berri, David J., 2011. "Mixing the princes and the paupers: Pay and performance in the National Basketball Association," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(3), pages 381-388, June.
    9. repec:lan:wpaper:3944 is not listed on IDEAS
    10. repec:lan:wpaper:3551 is not listed on IDEAS
    11. Frank TENKORANG & Bree L. DORITY & Eddery LAM, 2014. "Nba Endgame: Do Salaries Matter?," Review of Economic and Business Studies, Alexandru Ioan Cuza University, Faculty of Economics and Business Administration, issue 14, pages 51-62, December.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:sae:jospec:v:2:y:2001:i:2:p:131-144. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (SAGE Publications). General contact details of provider: .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.