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Global Governance From Below: Regional Sanctions as Drivers of UN Sanctions

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  • Inken von Borzyskowski
  • Clara Portela

Abstract

The imposition of sanctions by the UN Security Council (UNSC) is notoriously selective. Many crises have qualified for UNSC sanctions by endangering peace and security, yet the UN has imposed sanctions in only a few. Selectivity in UNSC sanctions is conventionally explained by conflict intensity or the interests of the Council’s permanent members. Complementing these accounts, we document a third explanation: pre-existing sanctions by regional organizations. We argue that the UNSC has incentives to sanction countries which are already under sanctions by regional organizations because regional sanctions embody neighborhood consensus on the legitimacy of these sanctions and reassure the Council about implementation. Statistical analyses of original data, text analyses, a case study, and interviews strongly support our argument: regional sanctions increase the likelihood of UNSC sanctions adoption, particularly when these are enacted by regional organizations composed of neighboring states. This study advances research on sanctions, conflict resolution, and regime complexity.

Suggested Citation

  • Inken von Borzyskowski & Clara Portela, 2023. "Global Governance From Below: Regional Sanctions as Drivers of UN Sanctions," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 67(10), pages 1930-1958, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:jocore:v:67:y:2023:i:10:p:1930-1958
    DOI: 10.1177/00220027231153565
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    3. Stephen, Matthew D., 2018. "Legitimacy Deficits of International Organizations: design, drift, and decoupling at the UN Security Council," EconStor Open Access Articles and Book Chapters, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, vol. 31(1), pages 96-121.
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    Cited by:

    1. Portela, Clara & Mora-Sanguinetti, Juan S., 2023. "Sanctions effectiveness, development and regime type. Are aid suspensions and economic sanctions alike?," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 172(C).

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