Exchange Rate Evidence on the Effectiveness of United Nations Policy
This paper analyzes the effectiveness of international interventions through their impact on exchange rates. If a specific intervention actually increases (decreases) a country's economic and political stability, then its currency should appreciate (depreciate). Estimates suggest that peacekeeping forces in Lebanon caused long-run appreciations, while economic sanctions imposed upon South Africa only caused temporary depreciations. In both cases, repeated U.N. resolutions condemning or demanding actions, that were not backed by actual interventions, did not cause changes in the exchange rate. The results in this paper are supportive of predictions from the public choice approach applied to international organizations and policies. Copyright 1998 by Kluwer Academic Publishers
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Volume (Year): 95 (1998)
Issue (Month): 1-2 (April)
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