IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/sae/jocore/v61y2017i5p1073-1094.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Economic Sanctions and Demand for Protection

Author

Listed:
  • Amy Pond

Abstract

How do the distributional consequences of economic sanctions impact future trade policy? Regardless of whether sanctions are effective in achieving concessions, sanctions restrict international trade flows, creating rents for import-competing producers, who are protected from international competition. These rents can then be used to pressure the government to implement protectionist policies. Thus, while the lifting of sanctions directly facilitates some international transactions, sanctions also have an indirect effect. They create powerful domestic interest groups in the sanctioned country who seek market protection. I use multiple estimators to evaluate the effect of trade sanctions on tariff rates. The evidence is consistent with the argument that sanctions increase market protection in both the short and long run.

Suggested Citation

  • Amy Pond, 2017. "Economic Sanctions and Demand for Protection," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 61(5), pages 1073-1094, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:jocore:v:61:y:2017:i:5:p:1073-1094
    DOI: 10.1177/0022002715596777
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0022002715596777
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1177/0022002715596777?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Marc J. Melitz, 2003. "The Impact of Trade on Intra-Industry Reallocations and Aggregate Industry Productivity," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 71(6), pages 1695-1725, November.
    2. Becker, Gary S., 1985. "Public policies, pressure groups, and dead weight costs," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 28(3), pages 329-347, December.
    3. Edward D. Mansfield & Helen V. Milner & B. Peter Rosendorff, 2015. "Free to Trade: Democracies, Autocracies, and International Trade," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Edward D Mansfield (ed.), THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE, chapter 7, pages 127-143, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    4. Unknown, 2014. "Media Coverage 2014," 2014: Ethics, Efficiency and Food Security: Feeding the 9 Billion, Well, 26-28 August 2014 225573, Crawford Fund.
    5. Gary Clyde Hufbauer & Jeffrey J. Schott & Kimberly Ann Elliott, 2009. "Economic Sanctions Reconsidered, 3rd Edition (paper)," Peterson Institute Press: All Books, Peterson Institute for International Economics, number 4129, October.
    6. Dursun Peksen & A. Cooper Drury, 2010. "Coercive or Corrosive: The Negative Impact of Economic Sanctions on Democracy," International Interactions, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 36(3), pages 240-264, August.
    7. Gary Clyde Hufbauer & Jeffrey J. Schott & Kimberly Ann Elliott, 2007. "Economic Sanctions Reconsidered, 3rd edition (hardcover)," Peterson Institute Press: All Books, Peterson Institute for International Economics, number 4075, January.
    8. Cheryl Schonhardt-Bailey, 2006. "From the Corn Laws to Free Trade: Interests, Ideas, and Institutions in Historical Perspective," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262195437, December.
    9. Milner, Helen V. & Kubota, Keiko, 2005. "Why the Move to Free Trade? Democracy and Trade Policy in the Developing Countries," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 59(1), pages 107-143, January.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Jerg Gutmann & Matthias Neuenkirch & Florian Neumeier & Armin Steinbach, 2018. "Economic Sanctions and Human Rights: Quantifying the Legal Proportionality Principle," Research Papers in Economics 2018-02, University of Trier, Department of Economics.
    2. Ilieva, Jana & Dashtevski, Aleksandar & Kokotovic, Filip, 2018. "Economic Sanctions In Internationallaw," UTMS Journal of Economics, University of Tourism and Management, Skopje, Macedonia, vol. 9(2), pages 201-211.
    3. Mirkina, Irina, 2018. "FDI and sanctions: An empirical analysis of short- and long-run effects," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 54(C), pages 198-225.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Dizaji, S.F. & Lis, P. & Murshed, S.M. & Zweiri, M., 2020. "What the political economy literature tells us about blockades and sanctions," ISS Working Papers - General Series 130655, International Institute of Social Studies of Erasmus University Rotterdam (ISS), The Hague.
    2. Fuchs, Andreas, 2016. "China’s Economic Diplomacy and the Politics-Trade Nexus," Working Papers 0609, University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics.
    3. Daniel McCormack & Henry Pascoe, 2017. "Sanctions and Preventive War," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 61(8), pages 1711-1739, September.
    4. Jerg Gutmann & Matthias Neuenkirch & Florian Neumeier, 2020. "Precision-guided or blunt? The effects of US economic sanctions on human rights," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 185(1), pages 161-182, October.
    5. Jerg Gutmann & Matthias Neuenkirch & Florian Neumeier & Armin Steinbach, 2018. "Economic Sanctions and Human Rights: Quantifying the Legal Proportionality Principle," Research Papers in Economics 2018-02, University of Trier, Department of Economics.
    6. von Soest, Christian & Wahman, Michael, 2013. "Sanctions and Democratization in the Post-Cold War Era," GIGA Working Papers 212, GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies.
    7. Fuchs, Andreas & Klann, Nils-Hendrik, 2013. "Paying a visit: The Dalai Lama effect on international trade," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 91(1), pages 164-177.
    8. Besedeš, Tibor & Goldbach, Stefan & Nitsch, Volker, 2021. "Cheap talk? Financial sanctions and non-financial firms," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 134(C).
    9. Dizaji, S.F. & Murshed, S.M., 2020. "The impact of external arms restrictions on democracy and conflict in developing countries," ISS Working Papers - General Series 128245, International Institute of Social Studies of Erasmus University Rotterdam (ISS), The Hague.
    10. Jin Mun Jeong, 2020. "Economic sanctions and income inequality: impacts of trade restrictions and foreign aid suspension on target countries," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 37(6), pages 674-693, November.
    11. (ed.), 0. "Research Handbook on Economic Diplomacy," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 16053.
    12. Wilfred J. Ethier & Arye L. Hillman, 2017. "The Politics of International Trade," CESifo Working Paper Series 6456, CESifo.
    13. Abeliansky, Ana & Krenz, Astrid, 2015. "Democracy and international trade: Differential effects from a panel quantile regression framework," University of Göttingen Working Papers in Economics 243, University of Goettingen, Department of Economics.
    14. Ina C. Jäkel & Søren Østervig & Erdal Yalcin, 2024. "The effects of heterogeneous sanctions on exporting firms: Evidence from Denmark," Review of International Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 32(1), pages 161-189, February.
    15. Ilan Vertinsky & Yingqiu Kuang & Dongsheng Zhou & Victor Cui, 2023. "The political economy and dynamics of bifurcated world governance and the decoupling of value chains: An alternative perspective," Journal of International Business Studies, Palgrave Macmillan;Academy of International Business, vol. 54(7), pages 1351-1377, September.
    16. Afesorgbor, Sylvanus Kwaku & Mahadevan, Renuka, 2016. "The Impact of Economic Sanctions on Income Inequality of Target States," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 83(C), pages 1-11.
    17. Onialisoa Mirana Rakotoarivelo & Hanitriniaina Sammy Gr´egoire Ravelonirina, 2019. "On the Dynamic of Country Development," Journal of Mathematics Research, Canadian Center of Science and Education, vol. 11(2), pages 1-19, April.
    18. Gawande, Kishore & Krishna, Pravin & Olarreaga, Marcelo, 2009. "What Governments Maximize and Why: The View from Trade," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 63(3), pages 491-532, July.
    19. Chen, Yin E. & Fu, Qiang & Zhao, Xinxin & Yuan, Xuemei & Chang, Chun-Ping, 2019. "International sanctions’ impact on energy efficiency in target states," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 82(C), pages 21-34.
    20. Felbermayr, Gabriel & Kirilakha, Aleksandra & Syropoulos, Constantinos & Yalcin, Erdal & Yotov, Yoto V., 2020. "The global sanctions data base," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 129(C).

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:sae:jocore:v:61:y:2017:i:5:p:1073-1094. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: SAGE Publications (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://pss.la.psu.edu/ .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.