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The Effects of Within-Group Communication on Group Decision and Individual Choice in the Assurance and Chicken Team Games

Author

Listed:
  • Gary Bornstein
  • Danny Mingelgrin

    (Department of Psychology, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem)

  • Christel Rutte

    (Department of Work and Organizational Psychology, The University of Nijmegen)

Abstract

Two team games are introduced: a game of assurance and a game of chicken. The games were operationalized as a competition between two teams, with three players on each team, and were compared either with or without the opportunity for a within-team discussion. The authors found that the vast majority of the teams in both game types chose to compete, and almost all individual players abided by the group's decision. However, the rationale for choosing the competitive team strategy (as coded from group discussions) and the beliefs of individual team members following discussion (as reflected in the postdecision questionnaire) differed systematically as a function of game type.

Suggested Citation

  • Gary Bornstein & Danny Mingelgrin & Christel Rutte, 1996. "The Effects of Within-Group Communication on Group Decision and Individual Choice in the Assurance and Chicken Team Games," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 40(3), pages 486-501, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:sae:jocore:v:40:y:1996:i:3:p:486-501
    DOI: 10.1177/0022002796040003005
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    References listed on IDEAS

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