The effect of between-group communication on conflict resolution in the Assurance and Chicken team games
We studied conflict resolution in two types of intergroup conflicts modeled as team games, a game of Assurance where the groups’ incentive to compete is purely fear, and a game of Chicken where the groups’ incentive to compete is purely greed. The games were operationalized as competitions between two groups with three players in each group. The players discussed the game with other ingroup members, after which they met with the members of the outgroup for a between group discussion, and finally had a within-group discussion before deciding individually whether to participate in their group’s collective effort vis-a-vis the other group. We found that all groups playing the Assurance game managed to achieve the collectively efficient outcome of zero participation, whereas groups playing the Chicken game maintained a highly inefficient participation rate of 78%. We conclude that communication between groups is very effective in bringing about a peaceful resolution if the conflict is motivated by mutual fear and practically useless if the conflict is motivated by mutual greed.
|Date of creation:||Oct 2002|
|Publication status:||Published in Journal of Conflict Resolution, 2003, vol. 46, pp. 326-339.|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Feldman Building - Givat Ram - 91904 Jerusalem|
Web page: http://www.ratio.huji.ac.il/
More information through EDIRC
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:huj:dispap:dp296. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Tomer Siedner)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.